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I. INTRODUCTION

Montana has undergone four distinct law-making periods
regarding the legality of employee discharges.
The first period was the "at-will" employment period.
During this period, absent an employment contract, the
employment relationship between employers and employees
could be terminated by either "at-will."
Employers could
discharge employees for cause or no cause.
In 1982, the second period was ushered in with the Montana
Supreme Court's recognition that employment contracts
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2005
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contained a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 2 and in
1983, the court held that discharged employees alleging breach
of the covenant had a tort claim.3
Thereafter, the court
developed the law surrounding the tort remedy. This period was
criticized, by some, as being marked with uncertainty as to the
law and for high plaintiff jury damage awards.
The third period commenced in 1987 when the Montana
Legislature, reacting to these complaints, enacted the Wrongful
Discharge from Employment Act, hereafter "the Act," or
'MWDA."
Today, Montana law on employee discharges is largely
defined by the MWDA. The Act defines three plaintiff claims
arising out of discharge, limits plaintiff damages and makes the
Act the exclusive discharge remedy (i.e., the MWDA preempts
common law remedies).
The fourth period occurred in 1993, when the Montana
Supreme Court determined the MWDA only preempted claims
for "discharge," not for pre-discharge or post-discharge employer
misconduct.
This article is the first comprehensive treatment of the
4
MWDA and pre-discharge/post-discharge claims since 1996.
The article is divided into three topics: (1) the Montana
Wrongful Discharge Act; (2) common law causes of action apart
from the MWDA; and (3) practice and procedure issues that
arise in discharge cases.

2. In Gates v. Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 184, 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (1982),
[hereinafter Gates 1], the Montana Supreme Court determined that the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing applied to employment contracts.
3. In 1983, one year after Gates I, the Gates case again came before the court.
Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213 (1983) [hereinafter Gates I].
In Gates II, the court declared that breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
was a tort (as opposed to a contract breach, which would entitle plaintiffs to damages
based on "loss of bargain"), thus allowing plaintiffs to recover punitive damages and full
consequential damages. Id., 205 Mont. at 307, 668 P.2d at 214-15.
4. For three exceptional articles on the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act and the
Montana Supreme Court's development of wrongful discharge common-law prior to, and
shortly after the Act, see Shelly A. Hopkins & Donald C. Robinson, Employment At-Will,
Wrongful Discharge,and the Covenant of Good Faithand FairDealing in Montana, Past,
Present and Future, 46 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1985); LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana
Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful Dischargefrom Employment Act: A New Order
Begins, 51 MONT. L. REV. 94 (1990); and Donald C. Robinson, The First Decade of
Judicial Interpretation of the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act
(WDEA), 57 MONT.L. REV. 375 (1996).
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II. THE MONTANA WRONGFUL DISCHARGE ACT
The MWDA provides discharged employees with three
separate causes of action for wrongful employer discharges. 5 An
employee has a cause of action where: (1) the employer does not
have "good cause" for the employee's discharge; (2) the
employee's discharge constitutes a violation of the employer's
own written personnel policy; and (3) the employee's discharge is
in retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate a "public
'6
policy" or for reporting a violation of a "public policy."

A. Discharge
1. Discharge Generally
The Act defines "discharge" as a constructive discharge or
7
any other termination of employment, including resignation,
elimination of the job, layoff for lack of work, failure to recall or
rehire, and other cutbacks in the number of employees for
This definition of discharge
legitimate business reasons."
recognizes two types of discharge: (1) where the employer severs
the employment relationship; and (2) in the case of a
constructive discharge, where the employee severs the
relationship. These will be discussed separately.
2. Constructive Discharge
A constructive discharge "is no less wrongful than an actual

5. Motarie v. N. Mont. Joint Refuse Disposal Dist., 274 Mont. 239, 243, 907 P.2d
154, 156 (1995) (the Act provides three separate causes of action, two of which, public
policy violation and violation of an employer personnel policy, are applicable to both
probationary and permanent employees, while lack of "good cause" is applicable to only
permanent employees).
6. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1) (2003) (emphasis added) provides:
(1) A discharge is wrongful only if:
(a) it was in retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate public policy or for
reporting a violation of publicpolicy;
(b) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the
employer's probationary period of employment; or
(c) the employer violated the express provisions of its own written personnel
policy.
7. The inclusion of the word "resignation" in the definition of a "discharge" refers
to an employee's voluntary secession of employment in the context of a "constructive
discharge."
8.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(2) (2003).
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firing.... ." The Act defines a constructive discharge:
[It] means the voluntary termination of employment by an
employee because of a situation created by an act or omission of
the employer which an objective, reasonable person would find so
intolerable that voluntary termination is the only reasonable
alternative. [It] ...does not mean voluntary termination because
of an employer's refusal to promote the employee or improve
wages, responsibilities, or other terms and conditions of
employment. 10

Determining whether there has been a constructive discharge
"rests with the finder of fact who must decide, under the totality
of circumstances, whether the employer has rendered working
conditions so intolerable that resignation is the only reasonable
alternative,"" and such a finding must be supported by more
than the employee's subjective judgment that working
12
conditions are intolerable.
Telling an employee that he or she has a choice-resign or
be fired-is a constructive discharge, even when the employee
signed an acknowledgment that retirement was voluntary and
accepted a retirement package. 13
For instance, telling a
manager that he or she was terminated as manager, followed by
an offer for a sales position, was considered a constructive
discharge.

14

However, a demotion, where the employee continued to
work, was not considered a constructive discharge.1 5 Rather,
6
there must be a complete severance of employment.'

9. Pankrantz Farms, Inc. v. Pankrantz, 2004 MT 180,
72, 322 Mont. 133, 72,
95 P.3d 67, 72.
10. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(1).
11. Pankrantz, 72 (citing Jarvenpaa v. Glacier Electric Coop., Inc., 271 Mont.
477, 481, 898 P.2d 690, 692 (1995)).
12. Kestell v. Heritage Health Care Corp., 259 Mont. 518, 524, 858 P.2d 3, 11
(1993). See also Bellanger v. Am. Music Co., 2004 MT 392, 325 Mont. 221, 104 P.3d
1075.
13. See Jarvenpaa v. Glacier Electric Coop., Inc., 271 Mont. 477, 898 P.2d 690
(1995).
14. See Howard v. Conlin Furniture No. 2, Inc., 272 Mont. 433, 901 P.2d 116
(1995).
15. Clark v. Eagle Sys., Inc., 279 Mont. 279, 285, 927 P.2d 995, 998-99 (1996).
16. Id. See also Pankrantz, 73 (plaintiff, a shareholder employee of a family
farm, was not constructively discharged when his salary was reduced and he continued
to reside at the corporations ranch house and perform services to the corporation; salary
cuts were consistent with past practices of reducing salaries for economic purposes and
affected each shareholder equally).
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3. Discharge Duringthe ProbationaryPeriod
The Act provides that a lack of "good cause" claim is not
Montana Code
available to probationary employees. 17
Annotated section 39-2-904(2) states that:
(a) During a probationary period of employment, the employment
may be terminated at the will of either the employer or the
employee on notice to the other for any reason or for no reason 18
(b) If an employer does not establish a specific probationary
period or provide that there is no probationary period prior to or at
the time of hire, there is a probationary period of 6 months from
the date of hire. 19

As a general rule, a probationary employee may bring a claim
for a "public policy" violation or a violation of the employer's own
written "personnel policies," but a claim based on lack of "good
cause" is subject to a motion to dismiss. 20 However, Montana
police officers, and potentially other Montana public employees
subject to a statutory probationary period, may be precluded
21
from bringing any of the three separate claims for relief.

17. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b).
18. Id. § 39-2-904(2)(a). This provision was added by the Legislature in 1987. See
1987 Mont. Laws 1765.
This provision was added by the
19. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2)(b).
Legislature in 2001. See 2001 Mont. Laws 3051.
20. The Act provides three separate causes of action, two of which, public policy
violation and violation of an employer personnel policy, are applicable to both
probationary and permanent employees, while lack of "good cause" is applicable to only
permanent employees. Motarie, 274 Mont. at 243, 907 P.2d at 156. See also Bond v.
The Bon, Inc., No. 97-35292, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 26947 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 1998).
21.
In Ritchie v. Town of Ennis, 2004 MT 43, 320 Mont. 94, 86 P.3d 11, the
Montana Supreme Court determined that, because police officers are subject to specific
statutory probationary periods, during which time their term may be revoked, Montana
Code Annotated section 7-32-4113 provides that a police officer must "serve a
probationary period of not more than one year ... [and] [a]t any time before the end of
such probationary term the mayor or the manager in those cities operating under the
commission-manager plan, may revoke such appointment." A police officer who's
employment was revoked during the probationary period has no claim under any of the
three causes of action under the MWDA. Ritchie, 1 26. The court said allowing a claim
under the MWDA for a probationary police officer "would be to substantially remove [the
statutory] discretion and ignore that obligation a mayor has to determine who is fit to
24.
police the law of a town after reviewing conduct during a probationary period." Id.
The effect of Ritchie, as noted in Justice Leaphart's dissent, is that a probationary police
officer may be discharged for refusing an employer directive to violate public policy or for
39 (Leaphart, J.,
reporting a public policy violation (i.e., whistle blower). Id.
dissenting). At first glance, Justice Leaphart appears to have made an excellent point; a
law enforcement officer may be discharged for refusing an employer directive to violate
the law. See discussion of "public policy" violations infra pp. 341-43. There need not be
an actual violation; it is sufficient that the employee reported what he reasonably
believed to be a violation. Motarie, 274 Mont. at 243-45, 907 P.2d at 156-57 (1994).
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If the employer is going to impose a probationary period and
take advantage of the MWDA provision that, during the
probationary period, it need not demonstrate "good cause," it
must establish that the probationary period existed at the outset
of the employee's employment and that it was in effect at the
time of discharge. 22 An employer may provide a probationary
period far in excess of six months. 23 However, it must be specific
if it wants a probationary period in excess of the statutory six
24
months.
Where the purpose of the probationary period is to
determine an employee's competence, not just a prescribed
period of experience, and the employee's conduct or performance
is not satisfactory during the prescribed probationary period, an
employer may extend a probationary period to afford the
employee additional time to obtain competence and for its
review of the employee. 25 However, where the probationary
period is prescribed by law, the employer may not extend the
26
probationary period.
B. Good Cause
The MWDA defines "good cause" as a "reasonable jobrelated grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily

Should probationary police officers be making ad hoc unilateral decisions regarding the
'law," or should such an inexperienced officer be expected to defer to superiors on such
questions?
Finally, Ritchie appears equally applicable to firefighters who are statutorily
required to serve a six month probationary period and "thereafter the mayor or manager
may nominate and, with the consent of the council or commission, appoint such . . .
firefighters .. " MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-33-4122 (2003). See also Hunter v. City of Great
Falls, 2002 MT 331, 313 Mont. 231, 61 P.3d 764.
22. Whidden v. John S. Nerison, Inc., 1999 MT 110, 21, 294 Mont. 346, 21, 981
P.2d 271, 21.
23. Hobbs v. City of Thompson Falls, 2000 MT 336,
18, 303 Mont. 140, T 18, 15
P.3d 418, 1 18. See also Roos v. Kircher Pub. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 2004 MT 48,
3, 320
Mont. 128,
3, 86 P.3d 39, 7 3 (a Montana public school teacher normally serves a
probationary period of three years).
24. See Mitchell v. V-1 Propane, 19 Mont. Fed. Rep. 409 (1995) (a date reference on
which employee starts to receive benefits is not sufficient to establish a probationary
period).
25. Hunter, 77 13, 18 (probationary firefighter not subject to a statutory
probationary period of six months where "[n]othing in the statute.limits a firefighter's
probationary term to six months," and firefighter was orally informed that the
probationary period may be extended if his performance was insufficient to advance from
probationary to non-probationary status).
26. See, e.g., Hobbs,
17-18 (police officers are subject to a statutory probationary
period "of not more than 1 year").
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perform job duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or
27
other legitimate business reason."
1. Good Cause Reasons for Discharge
The most common legitimate reasons for a discharge are
28
based on: (1) employee conduct-employment "rule" violations
and/or failure to perform in conformity with the employer's
legitimate expectations 29; and (2) business needs unrelated with
employee conduct (e.g., economic slowdown resulting in layoffs,
business reorganization resulting in loss of positions,
3
contracting out the work resulting in loss of positions, etc). 0
2. Plaintiff'sAttack of Defendant's Assertions of "Good Cause"
The plaintiffs attack of defendant's assertion of "good
cause" involves one or more of the following biases: (1) General
Denial-thereis no plaintiff misconduct (i.e., the plaintiff did not
commit a rule violation or have a performance failure), nor was
there any other alleged 'legitimate business reason" (e.g., no
economic slowdown, reorganization, contracting-out, etc.); (2)
Pretext-the defendant's alleged reason for discharge (e.g.,
employee misconduct/other legitimate business reason) may
have occurred, but is asserted by the defendant merely as
pretext to hide the real and impermissible reason for
discharge; 31 (3) Mitigating Factors-the defendant's alleged

27. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5). See Cole v. Valley Ice Garden, L.L.C., 2005
MT 21,
28, 325 Mont. 388, 28, - P.3d _, 28 (a non-MWDA case, where the court
relies on the Act for guidance in determining the meaning of the employment contract
term "cause").
28. The MWDA cites one example of this broad category: "disruption of the
employer's operation." Id. See also Morton v. M-W-M, Inc., 263 Mont. 245, 868 P.2d 576
(1994) (plaintiffs conduct was dishonest and disloyal-plaintiff took vacation to tend to
her family and used the vacation to work at a competitor restaurant). Other examples of
typical employer rules relate to clocking in/out, gaining permission to leave work early,
appropriate use of sick leave, insubordination, etc.
29. The MWDA uses the term "failure to satisfactorily perform job duties." MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5).
30. The MWDA specifically addresses this category by stating that discharge
includes "elimination of the job, layoff or lack of work, failure to recall or rehire, and any
other cutback in the number of employees for a legitimate business reason." Id. § 39-2903(2) (defining "discharge").
31.
For example, a defendant might allege that a plaintiff had performance
failures. The plaintiff may acknowledge such failures, but claim that they are asserted
only to cover for the real and impermissible reason for discharge. That is, he was
discharged because, as coach of the after-school little league team on which the
defendant's daughter plays, he did not coach and/or play the daughter to the satisfaction
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reason(s) for discharge may have occurred, but it is not a
"reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal" (i.e., there were
mitigating factors). 32
In Buck v. Billings Montana Chevrolet, Inc., the Montana
Supreme Court stated that a legitimate reason "is a reason that
is neither false, whimsical, arbitrary or capricious, and it must
have some logical relationship to the needs of the business."' 33
The U.S. District Court for the District of Montana has said that
"[1]egitimacy is negated if the reason given for the discharge is
invalid as a matter of law, if it rests on a mistaken
interpretation of the facts, or if it is merely a pretext for some
34
other illegitimate reason."
Based on Buck, some Montana employers believe they are
entitled to discharge an employee who failed to "satisfactorily
perform job duties." The problem with this conclusion is that
the failure to perform job duties must, under the Act's definition
of good cause, be a "reasonable job-related grounds for
dismissal."35 However, it has been determined that not all
failures to perform may properly be placed at the feet of the
employee. In Andrews v. Plum Creek Manufacturing,36 -the
Montana Supreme Court determined that an employee who
received no training, no written job standards, no job
evaluations, inadequate supervision, and no disciplinary
warnings could survive a motion for summary judgment. The
court rejected the employer's position that failure to perform job
duties constitutes just cause, regardless of who is at fault.
Implicitly, the court determined that, in determining "good
cause," it is relevant to consider whether the employer is to
blame for the employee's failures.3 7
of the defendant. Or, alternatively, a defendant might allege that it experienced an
economic slowdown, which necessitated the layoff of the plaintiff. The plaintiff may
acknowledge the slowdown, but claim the real reason for the discharge was not the
slowdown, but because of his treatment of the defendant's daughter on the little league
team.
32. For a list of mitigating factors see infra pp. 381-82.
33. 248 Mont. 276, 281-83, 811 P.2d 537, 540-41 (1991) (new owner of a car
dealership replaced executive manager, a long-term faithful employee of previous owner,
pursuant to new owner's policy of replacing existing manager when purchasing a
business-this is acceptable when employee occupies a "sensitive managerial or
confidential position" but not so, for lower echelon employees).
34. Kelly v. Federal Express Corp., 28 Mont. Fed. Rep. 135, 147 (2001).
35.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 39o2-903.

36. 2001 MT 94,
16, 24, 305 Mont. 194,
16, 24, 27 P.3d 426,
16, 24.
37. Id.
17-19. This does not result in the conclusion that an employee may
criticize her supervision, create supervisor animosity, and then claim that her discharge
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In Marcy v. Delta Airlines,38 Judge Molloy, of the Montana
Federal District Court, determined that a discharge was
"arbitrary because an admittedly exemplary employee was
summarily fired for mistakes in a time-keeping system that was
shown to be imperfect and sloppily administered." 39 Thus,
where the employee's performance failure is the fault (or at least
partial fault) of the employer, the discharge may not be
sustained.
A major obstacle the plaintiff must overcome in attacking
the defendant's allegation of "good cause" is overcoming the
defendant's likely motion for summary judgment. This topic is
discussed in further detail later in this article.
C. PersonnelPolicy
1. PersonnelPolicy Generally
An employee discharge is wrongful where an employer
violates the express provisions of its own written personnel
policy. 40 Such a violation generally occurs in two situations: (1)
where the employer violates its written policy that an employee
may be discharged for only specified grounds, and the specified
grounds are not present (i.e., the policy states that discharge is
proper for a first offense only in the cases of insubordination,
theft, striking a supervisor or co-employee, etc.); or (2) the
written policy provides that discharge may occur only after an
employee is accorded specified procedures that were not
accorded the plaintiff (e.g., a hearing, progressive discipline,
performance evaluations, training, transfer, etc.).
Some employers have policies that a discharge may occur
only after some form of procedural process, including progressive
discipline, or, in the absence of progressive discipline, for certain
specified offences. For example:
Section V. Discharge
was unlawful based solely on supervisor animosity.
38. 21 Mont. Fed. Rptr. 507 (1997), affd 166 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1999).
39. Id. at 511.
40.

MONT.

CODE

ANN.

§

39-2-904(1)(c).

See,

e.g.,

Kearney

v.

KXLF

Communications, Inc., 263 Mont. 407, 417-18, 869 P.2d 772, 778 (1994) (despite the fact
that employer's formal personnel policies did not contain a policy requiring evaluations, it was a
question of fact, to be determined by the jury, whether employer's personnel policy expressly required
annual evaluations of all its employees where plaintiffs expert testified that such policy existed when
other employees were evaluated by employer using a reprinted form, and a supervisor
had issued a memorandum calling for evaluations).
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1. Absent an offense defined in subsection (2), an employee will
discipline.
not be discharged absent progress/corrective
Progressive/corrective discipline will normally include a verbal
warning, a written warning, and a suspension prior to discharge.
However, the nature and extent- of the progressive/corrective
discipline will depend on the circumstances.
2. The following shall be causes for immediate discharge:
a) Bringing illegal intoxicants, narcotics or other dangerous
drugs to the work place, using such drugs while at the work
place, or reporting for duty under the influence of such drugs;
b) Insubordination;
c) Bringing to or keeping at the work place any firearm or
knife with a blade in excess of three inches or any other

weapon....
2. Employer UnilateralChanges to Personnel Policies
One issue that may arise is the effect, if any, of an
employer's unilateral change in its written personnel policy
during the term of the employee's employment.
In Jewell u. North Big Horn Hospital District,the Wyoming
Supreme Court determined that the employer's unilateral
change in its employee handbook, from a policy according more
job security, to a policy according less security, is invalid absent
the employer's retention of the right to make unilateral changes
or specific considerations. 41 Finding no consideration, the court
determined that the change in policy was invalid as to an
42
employee employed at the time of thechange.
Thereafter, in Arch of Wyoming, Inc. v. Sisneros, the
Wyoming Supreme Court determined that, where the employer's
policy contained language on the last page of the handbook
stating that the employer may unilaterally modify the
handbook, it was precluded from making an effective
modification for existing employees. 43 The court said the right to
unilaterally modify must be "conspicuous and unambiguous,"
and the employer's later revision of the handbook, in which it
moved the disclaimer from the last page to the first page, failed
44
to change the nature of its relationship with its employees.

41. 953 P.2d 135, 137-38 (Wyo. 1998).
42. Id. at 138.
43. 971 P.2d 981, 984 (Wyo. 1999).
44. Id. See also Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140 (Inl. 1999) (employer
inclusion of a disclaimer in handbook does not affect the rights of pre-existing employees
where employer had not reserved the right to amend the handbook and provided no
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Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court determined that a
seniority provision included in the company's "policy-andprocedure manual," which was only given to supervisors and not
included in the "employee handbook," applied to non-supervisory
employees when those employees were orally informed that the
policy applied to them. 45 However, the employer's disclaimer
was not effective absent evidence that the non-supervisory
46
employees assented to the disclaimer.
The California Supreme Court has determined that an
employer may unilaterally terminate a policy that contains a
specified condition of employment of indefinite duration, if the
employer effects the change after a reasonable time, on
reasonable notice, and without interfering with the employees'
47
vested interests.
D. Retaliation-PublicPolicy
A discharge is wrongful if it is in retaliation for an
employee's refusal to violate public policy or for reporting a
violation of public policy. 48 The Act defines a "public policy" as
"a policy in effect at the time of the discharge concerning the
public health, safety, or welfare established by constitutional
provision, statute, or administrative rule."49 The policy must be
one that is for the benefit of the public as a whole, not one that
50
simply benefits a particular employee.
To establish a public policy violation, it is not necessary that
a plaintiff demonstrate the employer in fact violated the
constitutional, statutory, administrative rule prohibition, or
duty, but only that she had a reasonable good faith basis to
believe that a violation had, or would, occur. 51 "Thus, regardless
of whether the employee's report actually results in a citation or
consideration other than continued employment).
45. Stokes v. Amoco Fabrics & Fibers Co., 729 So.2d 330, 332 (Ala. 1997).
46. Id.
47. Asmus v. Pac: Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 81 (Cal. 2000).
48. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(a).
49. Id. § 39-2-903(7).
50. See Foster v. Albertsons, Inc., 254 Mont. 117, 835 P.2d 720 (1992) (sexual
harassment is against public policy-employee was discharged for refusing supervisor's
sexual advances). See also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
51. Motarie, 274 Mont. at 244-45, 907 P.2d at 157 (the MWDA "protects a good
faith 'whistle blower"'). See also Stuart v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 753 F. Supp. 317 (D.
Kan. 1990), affd, 936 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1991). But see Bott v. Rockwell Int'l, 908 P.2d
909, 914 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (no cause of action where employee has only good faith
belief that aviolation has occurred; need an actual violation).
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investigation, the test is whether the employee made the report
in good faith."52 Additionally, the employee complaint about the
violation of public policy need only be directed to the employer,
not the legal authority that has jurisdiction over the alleged
53
violation.
However, even if the court will allow a cause of action based
on an employee's reasonable and good faith belief, there is no
cause of action based on the employee's conduct that is merely a
difference of opinion with the employer.5 4 Additionally, even
though the court will allow a cause of action based on the
employee's honest and reasonable belief, it may not result in
punitive damages because an arguable difference of opinion
between the employer and the employee regarding the
"duty/prohibition does not constitute 'actual fraud or malice"'
necessary for punitive damages. 55
The reason plaintiffs often include a "public policy"
allegation in a complaint is that it is the only claim for which
the statute provides for punitive damages. The Act provides
that, if a public policy violation is established, the "employee
may recover punitive damages otherwise allowed by law if it is
established by clear and convincing evidence that the employer
engaged in actual fraud or actual malice in the discharge of the
56
employee .... "
The following categories of behavior may involve "public
57
policy" violations:
1. Preservingthe Integrity of the JudicialProcess
Examples of conduct that involve preserving the integrity of
the judicial process are: refusal to commit perjury on the
employer's behalf;58 refusal of an employer to grant an employee
52. Motarie, 274 Mont. at 245, 907 P.2d at 157.
53. See Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
54. See House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 556 A.2d 353 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989) (no cause of action where action is based on a mere difference of opinion with
employer).
55. See Trifad Entm't, Inc. v. Anderson, 2001 MT 227, 306 Mont. 499, 36 P.3d 363.
56. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(2) (2003). In Trifad, the Montana Supreme Court
defines the terms "actual fraud or actual malice." Trifad, T 53. See also MONT. CODE
ANN § 27-1-221 (2003), regarding proof of punitive damages.
57. See generally Nina G. Stillman, Wrongful Discharge: Contract, Public Policy,
and Tort Claims, 614 PRACTICING L. INST. LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK

SERIES 843 (Oct.-Nov. 1999).
58. See, e.g., Merkel v. Scowill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 133 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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leave to honor a subpoena or serve jury duty; and exercise of a
citizen's right to file suit.
2. Refusal to Commit or Participatein an Unlawful Act or
Reporting of Same
If there is a statutory prohibition (e.g., against the release of
pollutants) or duty (e.g., duty to file accurate and complete
information with a regulatory agency) on the employer or others,
an employer's demand that its employee violate the statute,
under threat of discharge, creates a "retaliation" public policy
claim. 59
For example, assume a mental health service employee was
discharged by her employer for allegedly unsatisfactory work
performance and failure to follow the employer's rules. The
employee argues that the real reason for her discharge was her
advocacy for the mental health patients. She cites Montana
statutes that require mental health organizations to address the
needs of such patients and statutory professional standards that
require health service professionals to do likewise. This fact
situation gives rise to a claim based on a violation of public
60
policy.
If the statute that creates the duty/prohibition provides a
private cause of action (i.e., the plaintiff employee may sue the
employer directly under the statute), the plaintiff does not have
a cause of action under the MWDA. The Act provides that it
does not apply where a plaintiff has a "procedure or remedy"
61
under a statute that provides a duty/prohibition.

59. Prohibition/duty statutes almost always concern health, safety, or welfare
issues. Examples include: anti-trust laws, bankruptcy protection laws, consumer
protection laws, public health and safety laws, official misconduct laws, codes of ethics,
etc.
60. See generally Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management Serv., 188 Cal. App. 3d
1437 (4th Dist. 1987) (nurse discharged for refusing to work on an understaffed shift
that she felt endangered the heath and safety of the patients; statute provided the basis
for the public policy violation supporting her wrongful discharge claim), overruled on
other grounds by Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (1992).
61. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912 (2003). See Hash v. U.S. West Communications
Serv., 268 Mont. 326, 332, 886 P.2d 442, 226 (1994) (Montana Human Rights Act
provides the exclusive remedy for discrimination based on "protected class status" (e.g.,
gender, race, religion, etc.)); Deeds v. Decker Coal Co., 246 Mont. 220, 223, 805 P.2d
1270, 1271-72 (1990) (plaintiff has a right or remedy if and when the General Counsel
issues a complaint alleging a violation of the National Labor Relations Board); Tonack v.
Mont. Bank of Billings, 258 Mont. 247, 254-55, 854 P.2d 326, 331 (1993) (plaintiff may
file suit under both the MWDA and the statute providing the duty/prohibition-here the
Federal Age Act-but the MWDA suit will not proceed until it is determined that
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3. Codes of Ethics
Professional employees frequently have ethical standards
imposed by their professional organizations. Generally, these
standards are not incorporated in statutory provisions or
administrative rules.
However, if these standards are
incorporated into statutes or administrative rules, and the
employer insists that the employee perform inconsistent with
the professional standards coupled with retaliation for failing to
do so, the employee will have a claim based on a public policy
violation.
E. Exemptions
The MWDA provides for three exemptions: (1) employees
who have a procedure or remedy under any other state or
federal statute for contesting the discharge must rely upon those
statute(s) to contest the discharge, not the MWDA; (2)
employees covered by a written union-management collectively
bargained agreement for a specific term must rely on their
contract remedies for contesting the discharge; and (3) any
employee covered by a written employment agreement for a
specific term must rely on contract remedies for contesting the
discharge. 62 The purpose of these exemptions is to assure that
an unlawfully discharged employee may rely on the MWDA only
as a last resort in contesting the discharge. If the employee has
an alternative statutory cause of action and/or a contract cause
of action, those claims are the employee's exclusive cause of
action.
1. A Statute, Other Than the MWDA, Providinga Procedureor
Remedy for Contesting the Discharge
The prospective plaintiff is to rely on any other Montana
state or federal statute that provides a procedure or remedy for
plaintiff does not have a cause of action under duty/prohibition statute).
62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912 provides:
This [Act] does not apply to a discharge:
(1) that is subject to any other state or federal statute that provides a procedure or
remedy for contesting the dispute. The statutes include those that prohibit discharge for
filing complaints, charges, or claims with administrative bodies or that prohibit unlawful
discrimination based on race, national origin, sex, age, disability, creed, religion, political
belief, color, marital status, and other similar grounds.
(2) of an employee covered by a written collective bargaining agreement or a written
contract of employment for a specific term.
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contesting the discharge. So, for example, if a former employee
alleges that she was discharged because of her gender, she must
contest the discharge by bringing a sex discrimination action
under the Montana Human Rights Act 6 3 and/or Title VII of the
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.64 The Montana Supreme Court
has held that the Montana Human Rights Act provides the
exclusive remedy for cases alleging a discriminatory discharge
based on protected class status, as defined in the Montana
Human Rights Act (e.g., race, gender, religion, age, handicap,
6
color, national origin, etc.).
When there is an alternative procedure or remedy, a
plaintiff may pursue that cause of action concurrently with a
MWDA suit. However, the plaintiff will not be entitled to
remedial relief under the MWDA until it is determined that the
other statutory remedy does not provide some measure of
redress. 66 If it is ultimately determined that the plaintiff is not
entitled to a remedy under the "other" federal or state statute,
67
she may proceed with the MWDA case.
Accordingly, the plaintiff will want to file all state and
federal claims for relief-particularly to protect against statute
of limitations problems-and seek a motion to stay the MWDA
case until it is determined if remedial relief is obtained
elsewhere. However, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Montana has allowed a plaintiff to proceed simultaneously on
alternative theories under the Montana Human Rights Act and
68
the MWDA.
2. Written Collective BargainingAgreement
In cases where an employee is covered by a unionmanagement collective bargaining agreement, the employee's
rights set forth in the agreement are her exclusive discharge
69
rights.

63. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-101 to 602 (2003).
64. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (2000).
65. Hash, 268 Mont. at 332, 886 P.2d at 446.
66. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 255, 854 P.2d at 331.
67. Shultz v. Stillwater Mining Co., 277 Mont. 154, 157, 920 P.2d 486, 488 (1996).
68. Salvagni v. Placer Dome U.S., Inc., 23 Mont. Fed. Rep. 1, 3 (1997).
69. Indeed, assuming the employer is in the private sector (e.g., Albertsons, as
opposed to a governmental employer) and is also a statutorily defined "employer" for the
purposes of the Federal National Labor Relations Act, the federal Act preempts the
MWDA, and the employee must pursue the method provided in the collective bargaining
agreement to contest the discharge. See discussion infra pp. 352-53. See also Barnes v.
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If, as is the normal case, the collective bargaining
agreement has a grievance procedure that includes the right to
contest the discharge, the employee must exhaust the grievance
"[U]nion
procedure before instituting a MWDA action. 70
employees 'must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure
agreed upon by the employer and the union as the mode of
redress,' for a 'contrary rule which would permit an ... employee
to completely sidestep available grievance procedures in favor of
a lawsuit has little to recommend it."'71
Additionally, if the collectively bargained agreement makes
arbitration the exclusive remedy for contesting a grievance not
resolved in the employee's favor, arbitration is the employee's
72
exclusive remedy.
The fact that the union determines that a bargaining unit
member's discharge grievance lacks merit, and, thus, refuses to
take the matter to arbitration, does not allow the unit member
to avoid the exclusivity of the collectively bargained grievance
procedure/arbitration provisions and bring a claim under the
MWDA. 73 Additionally, the fact that the bargaining unit
member was denied a forum to litigate her dispute is not
inconsistent with the MWDA, nor is the Act unconstitutional
because she is deprived a remedy or access to a court when the

Stone Container Corp., 942 F.2d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 1991); Local Union No. 206, Int'l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers v. Qwest Corp., 30 Mont. Fed. Rep. 543 (2003) (bargaining unit
employee could not sue for breach of contract for discharge as his exclusive remedy was
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement; agreement provided that he may file
a grievance, but, because he had been employed less than a year, he was precluded from
seeking arbitration).
70. See, e.g., Lueck v. United Parcel Serv., 258 Mont. 2, 8, 851 P.2d 1041, 1045
(1993) (involving a private sector employer); McKay v. State, 2003 MT 274,
28, 317
Mont. 467, T 28, 79 P.3d 236, 28 (involving a public sector employer).
71. Lueck, 258 Mont. at 8, 851 P.2d at 1044-45 (citing Brinkman v. Mont., 224
Mont. 238, 244, 729 P.2d 1301, 1305-06 (1986)).
72. See generally McKay, 317 Mont. 467, 79 P.3d 236. In McKay, the court stated,
'The purpose of the rule is to encourage arbitration of disputes.... To allow a member of
the collective bargaining unit to completely sidestep available procedures would... exert
a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective
bargaining agreements and effectively deprive employers and unions of the ability to
establish a uniform and exclusive method for the orderly settlement of employee
grievances." Id.
25 (citing Small v. McRae, 200 Mont. 497, 504, 651 P.2d 982, 986
(1982), and Brinkman, 224 Mont. at 245, 729 P.2d at 1306). See also LaFournaise v.
Mont. Dev. Ctr., 2003 MT 240,
19, 317 Mont. 283,
19, 77 P.3d 202,
19 (an
arbitration provision included in a collectively bargained agreement is not a contract of
adhesion because arbitration provisions are negotiated into the contract by employer and
union).
73. LaFournaise, 7 24-29.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/3

18

2005

EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE DISPUTES

347

Corbett: Resolving Employee Discharge Disputes Under the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act

union refused to take her case to arbitration. 74 This is true for
employees employed both in the private sector and for those
employed by a the State of Montana or any subdivision of the
75
state.
3. Written Contracts of Employment
The Act also excepts employees covered by written contracts
of employment for a specific term. Undoubtedly, the largest
class of Montana employees who have written contracts of
employment for a specific term are school teachers (tenured and

non-tenured).76
74. Id.
75.
See Lueck, 258 Mont. 2, 851 P.2d 1041 (involving a private sector employer),
and McKay, 317 Mont. 467, 79 P.3d 236 (involving a public sector employer).
76. The Montana Code provides the circumstances under which both tenured and
non-tenured teachers may be discharged.
NON-TENURE TEACHERS:
The procedure for dismissing a non-tenured teacher is set out in Montana Code
Annotated section 20-4-207 (2003). A non-tenured teacher may be terminated "before
the expiration of teacher's employment contract for good cause." MONT. CODE ANN. §
20-4-207(1) (2003). The legislature did not define "good cause" or provide any guidelines.
Dismissal of a teacher may be recommended by (1) a district superintendent; (2) a
principal in a district without a superintendent; or (3) a county superintendent or a
trustee in a district without a superintendent or a principal. Id. § 2-4-207(2). A person
recommending the dismissal of a teacher must give notice of the recommendation in
writing to each trustee of the district and the teacher. This notice must state clearly and
explicitly the specific reasons for the recommendation. Id. § 2-4-207(2)(b).
Once the recommendation has been received by the trustees, they must notify the
teacher of his or her right to a hearing before the trustees. Such notice must be
delivered either by certified mail or by personal notification with a signed receipt
returned. Unless the teacher has waived the right to a hearing, the teacher and the
trustees shall agree to a hearing date not less than 10 days or more than 20 days from
the date of notice of the dismissal. Id. § 20-4-207(3)(a).
Unless the recommendation was made by a county superintendent, the person
recommending the dismissal may suspend the teacher with pay until the hearing date if
the teacher's behavior, that led to the recommendation, is contrary to the welfare of the
students or the effective operation of the school district. Id. § 20-4-207(4).
Any teacher who had been dismissed may appeal the dismissal in writing within 20
days under the guidelines set forth in Montana Code Annotated section 20-4-204. If the
teacher is not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the appeal is made to the
county superintendent. If the teacher is covered by a collective bargaining agreement,
the appeal shall be directed to an arbitrator. Id. § 20-4-207(5).
TENURE TEACHERS:
A tenured teacher is a teacher (not including superintendents or specialists)
who has accepted an offer of employment for "the fourth consecutive year of
employment ... in a position requiring teacher certification." Id. § 20.4-203. Like
the non-tenured teacher, the tenured teacher may be discharged for "good cause."
Id. § 20-4-203(4). The individuals who may recommend discharge of a tenured
teacher are the same as those who may recommend the discharge of a non-tenure
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The Montana Supreme Court has determined that, if the
parties enter into a written contract of employment for a
specified term, the employees' rights are governed by that
agreement and not the MWDA. 77 A written contract's failure to
contain a "specific term" does not trigger the MWDA's
exemption, and the discharge claim may be brought under the
MWDA. 78 A written contract of employment that states that the
employee serves "at will" does not exempt the employee from the
79
MWDA.
F. Limitation of Actions
The Act has a one-year statute of limitations (i.e., suits
"must be filed within 1 year after the date of discharge").8 0 The
"date of discharge" commences from the date the "employee is no
longer earning compensation from the employer, . . . and this
can only occur upon a complete severance of the employer''
employee relationship. 81
82
If the employer maintains written internal procedures,
under which an employee may appeal a discharge within the
organizational structure of the employer, the employee must

teacher, and the appeal process for both tenured and non-tenured teachers is also
the same.
There are, however, slight variations in the notice requirements. Under
Montana Code Annotated section 20-4-204, the person recommending the
termination of a tenure teacher's services is not required to give notice to the
teacher as they are under Montana Code Annotated section 20-4-207. Instead, the
notice is only required to be given by the trustees (in the same manner set forth in
Montana Code Annotated section 20-40-207), and, in addition, the trustees are
required to give the teacher a copy of Montana Code Annotated section 20-40-204
for informational purposes.
See generally Baldridge v. Board of Trustees, Rosebud County Sch. Dist. No. 19, 287
Mont. 53, 951 P.2d 1343 (1998); Michelle Bryan, Note, Baldridge v. Board of Trustees: A
Case for Reform of Montana's Tenured Teacher Dismissal Process, 61 MONT. L. REV. 251
(2000).
77. Farris v. Hutchinson, 254 Mont. 334, 340, 838 P.2d 374, 378 (1992); Schaal v.
Flathead Cmty. Coll., 272 Mont. 443, 447, 901 P.2d 541, 543 (1995).
78. Basta v. Crago, Inc., 280 Mont. 408, 415, 930 P.2d 78, 82 (1996). See also
Swain v. Mont. Cincha Co., 288 Mont. 538, 963 P.2d 456 (1998) (non-citeable opinion).
79. See Schillo v. Avista Communications of Mont., Inc., 30 Mont. Fed. Rep. 436,
439 (2002) (citing Whidden v. John C. Nerison, Inc., 1999 MT 110, 21, 294 Mont. 346,
21, 981 P.2d 271, 21).
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39.2-911 (2003).
81. Redfern v. Mont. Muffler, 271 Mont. 333, 335-36, 896 P.2d 455, 456 (1995) (fact
that employee had accrued five days of vacation time, which he was compensated for on
discharge date, does not extend statute of limitations an extra five days).
82. Other than those specified in Montana Code Annotated section 39-2-912.
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first exhaust those procedures prior to filing a MWDA claim.
The employee's failure to initiate and exhaust available internal
procedures is an employer defense to an action brought under
the MWDA.8 3 If the employer's internal procedures are not
completed within ninety days from the date the employee
initiates the internal procedures, the employee may file a
MWDA action, and the employer's internal procedures are
considered exhausted. The one-year statute of limitation period
is tolled until the procedures are exhausted, but the employer's
internal procedures may not extend the statute of limitation
84
period more than 120 days.
If the employer maintains written internal procedures,
under which an employee may appeal a discharge within the
organizational structure of the employer, the employer must,
within seven days of the date of the discharge, notify the
discharged employee of the existence of such procedures and
8 5
supply the discharged employee with a copy of them.
86

G. Remedies

The MWDA provides that the normal remedies consist of
lost wages8 7 and fringe benefits88 for a period not to exceed four
83.
See Offerdahl v. Mont., 2002 MT 5, 20, 308 Mont. 94, 1 20, 43 P.3d 275, 20
(employer's policy required plaintiff to file a grievance; plaintiffs earlier statement, that
he planned to file a grievance, did not satisfy the filing requirement) Id. $ 14-15.
84. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911(2).
85. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911(3). See Eadus v. Wheatland Mem'l Hosp. &
Nursing Home, 279 Mont. 216, 220, 926 P.2d 752, 755 (1996) (failure to notify plaintiff of
the internal procedures, and supply her with a copy of those procedures, relieves plaintiff
from exhausting the procedures prior to filing suit despite the fact that a copy of the
procedures has been supplied to her in the past). See also Casiano v. Greenway Enter.,
Inc., 2002 MT 93, 309 Mont. 358, 47 P.3d 432 (failure of employer to supply employee
with notice and copy of procedures relieved employee from complying with employer's
internal procedure; employer orally notified plaintiff of the procedures on the day of
discharge, but failed to provide a written copy of the procedures within seven days) Id.

$ 18-19, 21.
86. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905.
87. Montana Code Annotated section 39-2-903(6) defines "lost wages" as "the gross
amount of wages that would have been reported to the internal revenue service as gross
income on Form W-2 and includes additional compensation deferred at the option of the
employee."
88. Montana Code Annotated section 39-903(4) defines "fringe benefits" as "the
value of any employer-paid vacation leave, sick leave, medical insurance plan, disability
insurance plan, life insurance plan, and pension benefit plan in force on the date of
termination." Some fringe benefits are intended to vest from the commencement of
employment, or, at least upon the completion of the probationary period, e.g., medical
and life insurance. However, an employer may not want vacation and possible sick leave
benefits to vest until after the employee worked a certain period of time, e.g., six months,
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years from the date of discharge, together with interest. The
award is not mandatory, but within the discretion of the trier of
89
fact.
"Interim earnings, including amounts the employee could
have earned with reasonable diligence, must be deducted from
the amount awarded for lost wages. Before interim earnings are
deducted from lost wages, there must be deducted from interim
earnings any reasonable amounts expended by the employee in
searching for, obtaining, or relocating to new employment." 90
The employee may recover punitive damages for a
retaliation based on a public policy claim "if it is established by
clear and convincing evidence that the employer engaged in
actual fraud or actual malice in the discharge of the employee in
violation of' public policy. 9 1 Montana law defines "clear and
92
convincing" and "actual fraud or actual malice."
Apart from the remedies stated above, "[t]here is no right
under any legal theory to damages for wrongful discharge.., for
pain and suffering, emotional distress, compensatory damages,
punitive damages, or any other form of damages .... 93
H. Arbitration
Montana Code Annotated sections 39-2-914 and 39-2-915
authorize the arbitration of MWDA suits and provides
and that they do not vest entirely until the completion of an ever longer time period. For
example, in the case of "vacation leave," an employer may want to give an employee ten
days of leave during the first year of employment, but not intend vesting of all ten days
upon the commencement of employment, but that vesting begins one month from the
start of employment and that the full vesting occurs proportionally over the remaining
ten months, at the rate of one day per month. If the employer wants proportional
vesting it should make it clear in the benefit plan. Otherwise, the benefits may be
deemed to vest upon the commencement of employment. See Carbery v. Tundra
Holdings, Inc., 2002 MT 292N, 313 Mont. 422, 63 P.3d 513 (non-citeable opinion)
(employer was forced to admit that full vacation leave vested upon the commencement of
worker's employment even though employee was discharged after only one month of
employment).
89. Weber v. State, 253 Mont. 148, 153, 831 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1992); Tyner v. Park
County, 271 Mont. 355, 361-62, 897 P.2d 202, 206-07 (1995).
90. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(1). See also Weiler v. Leibenguth, 1 Mont. Fed.
Rptr. 360, 364-68 (1989) (employee that returns to school after making a diligent effort to
find work has properly mitigated and jury may award lost wages).
91. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-904(1)(a), 905(2).
92.
See Trifad Entm't, Inc. v. Anderson, 2001 MT 227, 53, 306 Mont. 449, 53,
53 (defining "actual fraud" and "actual malice"). See also MONT. CODE
36 P.3d 363,
ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (regarding the standard of proof required for punitive damages).
93. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(3). See Cole, 2005 MT 21, 325 Mont. 388, - P.3d
(contract providing for liquidated damages in the event of breach).
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incentives for parties to arbitrate. Subsection 914 provides:
(1) A party may make a written offer to arbitrate a dispute that
otherwise could be adjudicated under this part.
must be in writing and contain the
(2) An offer to arbitrate
94
following provisions:
(a) A neutral arbitrator must be selected by mutual agreement or, in the
absence of agreement, as provided in 27-5-211.
(b) The arbitration must be governed by the Uniform Arbitration Act,
Title 27, Chapter 5. If there is a conflict between the Uniform Arbitration
Act and this part, this part applies.
(c) The arbitrator is bound by this part.

(3) If a complaint is filed under this part, the offer to arbitrate
must be made within 60 days after service of the complaint and
must be accepted in writing within 30 days after the date the offer
is made.
(4) A discharged employee who makes a valid offer to arbitrate
that is accepted by the employer and who prevails in such
arbitration is entitled to have the arbitrator's fee and all costs of
arbitration paid by the employer.
(5) If a valid offer to arbitrate is made and accepted, arbitration is
the exclusive remedy for the wrongful discharge dispute and there
is no right to bring or continue a lawsuit under this part. Once an
offer to arbitrate has been accepted, neither the district court nor
the parties have a right to continue a previously filed lawsuit. 95
The arbitrator's award is final and binding, subject to review of
the arbitrator's 96decision under the provisions of the Uniform
Arbitration Act.

Section 39-2-915 provides:
Effect of rejection of offer to arbitrate. A party who makes a valid
offer to arbitrate that is not accepted by the other party and who
prevails in an action under this part is entitled as an element of
costs to reasonable attorney fees incurred subsequent to the date
97
of the offer.

94. If the offer to arbitrate fails to specifically comply with the requirements listed
in Montana Code Annotated section 39-2-914(2)(a), (b), and (c), the offer is voidable.
Penden v. La. Pac. Corp., 27 Mont. Fed.Rptr. 517, 519-21 (2000).
95. See Burkhart v. Semitool, Inc., 2000 MT 201, 23, 300 Mont. 480, 23, 5 P.3d
1031, T 23 (once an offer to arbitrate has been accepted, neither the district court, nor
the parties have a right to continue a previously filed lawsuit).
96. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914 (2003).
97. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-915. See Haider v. Frances Mahon Deaconess Hosp.,
2000 MT 32, 77 3-4, 298 Mont. 203, TT 3-4, 994 P.2d 1121, 7 3-4 (discussing district
court's award of plaintiffs attorney fees when employer refused plaintiffs request for
arbitration and plaintiff subsequently won in district coure), Muore v. imperial n1l."Is
Corp., 285 Mont. 188, 194, 948 P.2d 211, 215 (1997) (award of attorney fees includes fees
incurred on appeal to the Montana Supreme Court).
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I. MWDA Preemption of Common-Law Remedies
The MWDA provides that "no claim for discharge may arise
from tort or express or implied contract."9 8
The MWDA
preempts common law tort or contract actions arising out of the
discharge. However, a plaintiff may properly state a claim
arising out of the employment relationship and involving a
discharge where that claim is separate or independent of the
discharge. 99 If a common law claim could not arise "but for" the
discharge, the plaintiffs claims are inextricably intertwined
with, and based upon the termination and are preempted by the
Act. 10 0 These "separate and independent" claims are discussed
later.101
J. FederalPreemption of the MWDA
Federal preemption of the MWDA under the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution 10 2 (i.e., federal law preempts
contrary state law) arises any time Congress has enacted
legislation that provides the exclusive remedy for employees
contesting a discharge. Typically, preemption of the MWDA
occurs in two contexts: (1) where the National Labor Relations
Act or the Labor-Management Disclosure Act- of 1959 applies;
and (2) where the Employee Retired Income Security Act
applies.
1. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) & Labor-Management
DisclosureAct (LMDA) Preemption
a. NLRA
The NLRA prohibits statutorily defined private

98.

sector

MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-913 (2003).

99. Beasley v. Semitool, Inc., 258 Mont. 258, 263. .853 P.2d 84, 87 (1993) (in an
action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
wrongful discharge, plaintiff alleged that employer failed to abide by representations it
made during his employment; court determined that, although plaintiff had been
discharged, his contract claims were separate from the discharge).
100. Kulm v. Mont. State Univ.-Bozeman, 285 Mont. 328, 333, 948 P.2d 243, 246
(1997) (university professor, who took a position with the understanding the job would
last up to four years, was terminated after one year and sued for fraud and negligent
representation; the Montana Supreme Court held that his common law claims would not
have arisen but-for the termination and, thus, were preempted).
101.
See infra p. 354.
102. U.S. CONST. art. VI.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/3

24

353

2005
DISCHARGE
EMPLOYEE
Corbett:
Resolving Employee
Discharge
Disputes UnderDISPUTES
the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act
employers from discriminating against employees and
employment applicants for current or past union activities or for
engaging in protected concerted activities (e.g., strikes and other
collective activities). It also provides for contract lawsuits for
alleged employer breach of the collectively bargained agreement.
The Act has been determined to preempt state law that
addresses: (1) conduct either protected or prohibited by the Act
(Garmon preemption); 10 3 (2) conduct neither protected nor
prohibited, but intended by Congress to be left to the free play of
economic force between unions and employers; 10 4 and (3) conduct
that involves an interpretation of collectively bargained
agreements. 105
The typical state law claim that is preempted by Garmon
involves an employee discharged for engaging in union
activity. 10 6 In Bassette v. Stone Container Corp., the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that an expired collectively
bargained agreement, prior to a bargaining impasse, contained a
grievance-arbitration provision that preempted a bargaining
unit member's MWDA suit.107 However, when a plaintiff's
retaliatory discharge suit involves claims other than the
National Labor Relations Act protections/prohibitions (e.g.,
sexual harassment), and does not turn on any meaning of the
collective agreement, the suit is not federally preempted, 0 8 but
plaintiffs exclusive remedy may be other than the MWDA. 10 9
b. LMDA
The LMDA regulates internal union affairs (e.g., the union
member-union relationship) and preempts state law that

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1959).
103.
Garmon does not preempt matters of peripheral concern to the federal scheme or
matters deeply rooted in local feelings. Id. at 243-44.
104. Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1964); Lodge 76, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n., 427
U.S. 132, 149-51 (1976).
105.
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 403-12 (1988). This is
often not considered a separate category of NLRA preemption, but, in actuality, is
considered as part of Garmon preemption. See Bassette v. Stone Container Corp., 25
F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 1994).
106. See Deeds, 246 Mont. 220, 805 P.2d 1270 (1990) (alleging employer retaliatory
action against employees engaged in strike).
107. 25 F.3d at 760.
i08. Foster v. Aibertsons, inc., 254 Mont. 117, i27, 835 P.2d 720, 727 (1992). See
also Miller v. County of Glacier, 257 Mont. 422, 426-27, 851 P.2d 401, 403 (1993).
109. See suprapp. 344-45.
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interferes with this relationship. The Montana Supreme Court
has determined that the LMDA authorizes elected union officers
to appoint their own administrative subordinates (e.g., hire and
fire) and, consequently, a MWDA action by a subordinate who
had been discharged by an elected union officer has been held
preempted. 110
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Preemption
The purpose of ERISA is to insure that employees with
employment-related retirement and welfare benefits (other than
retirement, such as insurance, vacation, sick leave, etc.) are
regulated. There are three common employee causes of action
under ERISA: (1) wrongful employer denial of benefits;"' (2)
wrongful employer interference with an employee's attainment
of any right to participate in a benefit plan; 112 and (3) wrongful
employer discrimination against employees for exercising any
113
right under the benefit plan.
ERISA preemption occurs when an employee brings a
MWDA suit alleging that the employer's "motive" for the
discharge involved denial, interference or discrimination
regarding employment plan benefits. 1 4 There is no preemption
if the loss of benefits is a mere consequence of the termination,
rather than the principal motivating factor. 1 5
III. COMMON LAW CAUSES OF ACTION APART FROM THE MWDA
As discussed previously, the MWDA preempts any claim for
discharge that "may arise from tort or express or implied
contract."" 6 However, if the plaintiffs/employee's claim does not
arise from "discharge," the employee may state a tort or contract
claim apart from the MWDA. The Montana Supreme Court has
32, 317 Mont.
110. Vitullo v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 206, 2003 MT 219,
142, 32, 75 P.3d 1250, 32.
111. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (2000).
112. Id. § 1140 (2000).
113. Id.
114.
Campbell v. Aerospace Corp., 123 F.3d 1308, 1312-14 (9th Cir. 1997) (ERISA
preempts state law wrongful termination claims only when plaintiffs principal theory
involves a benefit-related motive); Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 799-800
(9th Cir. 1987) (the issue on ERISA preemption is employer motive). See also 29 U.S.C. §
1144 (2000).
115.
Campbell, 123 F.3d at 1313.
116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-913.
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determined that the MWDA only preempts claims for
117
"discharge," not for pre-discharge or post-discharge conduct.
Thus, if an employer violates any rights of an employee derived
from an employment contract (express or implied), or violates
any legal duties apart from contract (i.e., a tort), in a context
other than "discharge," the employee has a claim apart from the
MWDA.
Plaintiffs have been particularly inventive in pleading tort
and contract claims arising out of the employment relationship,
but not directed at discharge. Plaintiffs often cite three reasons
for such claims: (1) to collect greater damages than provided
under MWDA;" 8 (2) to obtain a longer statute of limitations; 119
and (3) to avoid the possibility that the defendant will seek to
arbitrate (because non-MWDA claims are not subject to the Act's
arbitration provision, e.g., a plaintiff may refuse to arbitrate
0
without risk).12
A. Contract Claims Not Preempted by the MWDA
In Beasley v. Semitool, the plaintiff/former employee
brought three claims against his former employer: (1) breach of
an oral contract (based on promises of bonuses, raises, higher
bonuses, and stock options); (2) breach of the implied contract
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) wrongful
discharge.' 2 ' A Montana district court, on the employer's motion
for summary judgment, dismissed the plaintiffs express
contract claims and implied contract claim involving the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 122 The Montana
Supreme Court reversed, and reinstated both of the contract
117. Beasley, 258 Mont. at 263, 853 P.2d at 87. For other similar cases, see Donald
C. Robinson, The First Decade of Judicial Interpretation of the Montana Wrongful
Dischargefrom Employment Act (WDEA), 57 MONT. L. REV. 375, 403-07 (1996).
118. Damages are limited to lost pay and benefits and interest for a term not to
exceed four years. The employee may also recover reasonable amounts expended in
searching for, obtaining, or relocating to new employment. From that amount, interim
earnings must be deducted. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(1). Punitive damages are
available based on a retaliation/public policy violation and then only if the plaintiff
demonstrates by "clear and convincing evidence that the employer engaged in actual
fraud or actual malice." Id. § 39-2-905.
119. The statute of limitations under the MWDA is one year. Id. § 39-2-911(1);
Redfern, 271 Mont. at 335, 896 P.2d at 456.
120. If the plaintiff rejects the defendant's offer to arbitrate, and the plaintiff loses
at trial, the plaintiff is responsible for the defendant's attorney fees. MONT. CODE ANN. §
39-2-915.
121. 258 Mont. at 260, 853 P.2d at 85.
122. Id., 258 Mont. at 260, 853 P.2d at 85.
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claims. 123 The court determined that the contract claims were
independent of the plaintiffs termination, and, thus, were not
24
preempted by the MWDA.1
The court distinguished an earlier case, Dagel v. City of
Great Falls,125 where the dismissal of the plaintiffs contract and
tort claims (breach of the convent of good faith and fair dealing)
were proper because they were "completely and inextricably
intertwined" with the plaintiffs discharge. 126 In Dagel, the
plaintiffs claims involved an alleged employer promise of
continued employment. 127 Clearly, when the contract claims
relate to promises of continued employment, procedural rights
prior to any discharge, and contract conditions for discharge, the
contract claims are intertwined with the discharge itself.
Indeed, if the procedural rights prior to discharge and the
conditions for discharge are in writing, a claim under the
MWDA may be asserted for violation of the employer's "written

personnel policy.128
Typically, employment contracts, either express or implied,
involve employer promises of wages, hours, fringe benefits, or
other terms and conditions of employment, including the
duration of the relationship, and the conditions on which the
Beasley stands for the
relationship may be terminated.
breach addresses wages,
contract
the
alleged
that
if
proposition
hours, fringe benefits, or other terms and conditions of
129
employment apart from discharge, there is no preemption.
B. Tort Claims Not Preempted by the MWDA
If the employer "duty" is imposed by "law," rather than
contract, the employee may have a tort action. 130 From the
123. Id., 258 Mont. at 263-64, 853 P.2d at 87.
124. Id., 258 Mont. at 263-64, 853 P.2d at 87.
125. 250 Mont. 224, 819 P.2d 186 (1991).
126. Beasley, 258 Mont. at 263, 853 P.2d at 86-87.
127. Id., 250 Mont. at 237, 819 P.2d at 194.
128. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(c) (discharging an employee is wrongful when
"the employer violated the express provisions of its own written personnel policy").
129. A plaintiffs claims of breach involving the alleged failure of the employer to
pay the prescribed wages/salary (including promised increases), provide benefits (health,
retirement, vacation, leave, etc.), or grant other terms or condition employment (e.g.,
advancement, training, autonomy, etc.) are apart from any discharge. See Beasley, 258
Mont. 258, 853 P.2d 84.
130. See Dan B. Dobbs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 3 (2000) ("contract duties are created
by the promises of the parties, while tort duties are created by the courts and imposed as
rules of law").
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perspective of the plaintiff, a tort action is superior to a contract
breach because the remedies for a tort are superior to those for a
contract breach. Accordingly, plaintiffs, when possible, will seek
a claim in tort rather than contract.
1. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith
As noted, in 1982, prior to the enactment of the MWDA, the
Montana Supreme Court recognized that employment contracts
131
contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and, a year later, held that discharged employees, alleging
132
breach of the implied covenant, had a tort cause of action.
Initially, plaintiffs relied upon this tort claim in discharge cases.
However, after the enactment of the MWDA, which preempts
common law claims arising from tort or contract, the court held
that breach of the covenant was preempted when it was alleged
in the context of a discharge. However, the court has held that
the implied covenant is not preempted when it is based on
allegations apart from discharge. In Beasley v. Semitool, the
court allowed the plaintiff, a former employee, to rely on the
implied covenant when the allegations involved the employer's
failure to comply with promised employee benefits prior to
discharge (i.e., pre-termination of oral promises of stock options,
133
bonuses, raises, even higher bonuses and advancement).
2. Intentionalor Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Montana Supreme Court has stated that the tort of
infliction of emotional distress is applicable in the employment
context. The tort combines the separate torts of intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress and is established upon
proof that the defendant inflicted serious or severe emotional
distress on the plaintiff, and such distress was the reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligent or
intentional act or omission. 34 Serious or severe emotional
distress occurs "only where the distress inflicted is so severe

that no reasonable [person ] could be expected to endure

131.
132.
133.
134.
(1995).
135.

it."135

See supranote 2.
See supranote 3.
258 Mont. 258, 262, 853 P.2d 84, 86.
Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, 271 Mont. 209, 232, 896 P.2d 411, 425
Id., 271 Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426.
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There is no recovery "where the plaintiff has suffered
exaggerated and unreasonable emotional distress, unless it
results from a peculiar susceptibility to such distress of which
the actor had knowledge."'136 "Other factors to be considered in
determining the severity of emotional distress are the intensity
and duration of the distress, circumstances under which the
infliction of emotional distress occurred, and the party
relationships involved.' 1 37 Damages for negligent infliction are
limited to compensatory damages. Punitive damages may arise
when there is allegation of intentional misconduct and the
requirements for statutory punitive damages are proven. 138
3. Defamation
The Montana Supreme Court recognizes that the tort of
defamation may arise in the employment context. 39 Typically,
defamation occurs when the employer makes defamatory
remarks about a plaintiff during the plaintiffs employment or
after employment has terminated. 40 However, truth is a
4
complete defense.' '
4. Interference with ProspectiveBusiness
Relationship/Advantage
With this tort, a third party interferes with a discharged
employee's ability to obtain future work or pursue other
The
advantages (e.g., prospective business relationships).
interference may be by any means, but in the employment
context, it is usually accomplished by communicating negative
information to prospective employers, or others, about the
136. Id., 271 Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426.
13, 324 Mont. 86, 13, 101 P.3d 773,
137. Renville v. Fredrickson, 2004 MT 324,
13 (citing Sacco, 271 Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426). See also Marcy v. Delta Airlines,
18 Mont. Fed. Rptr. 391 (1994).
138. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220 (2003) (providing for punitive damages);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (providing the required proof for punitive damages-clear
and convincing evidence of actual fraud or actual malice).
139. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 239, 896 P.2d at 429. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1801 (2003) (definition of defamation); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-804 (2003) (when
defamation is privileged).
140. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 214, 896 P.2d at 414 (post-discharge statements to police
that plaintiff had stolen company property). Meehan v. Amax Oil & Gas, Inc., 796 F.
Supp. 461, 466 (Colo. 1992) (post-discharge statement that plaintiff did a terrible job).
141. See Frigon v. Morrison-Maierle, Inc., 233 Mont. 113, 760 P.2d 57 (1988);
Palmisano v. Allina Health Systems, 190 F.3d 881 (Minn. 1999) (defamatory statements
about former manager's over billing are privileged).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/3

30

2005

EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE DISPUTES

359

Corbett: Resolving Employee Discharge Disputes Under the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act

plaintiff.
Intentional, and in some instances negligent
interference, coupled with defendant's lack of privilege (i.e., no
reasonable justification for the interference), is necessary to
142
state a claim.
Traditionally, courts have relied on the defendant's motive,
(e.g., ill will or spite) in considering whether the action was
privileged. However, if a defendant's activity is a form of
"speech," regulation
of such
speech raises potential
constitutional objections, the same objections that arise in
defamation cases. Here, the defendant is not liable unless the
statement is false, and the defendant is negligent or reckless in
failing to state the truth. 143 The only advantage of the tort, over
defamation, appears to be that the defendant's wrongful conduct
may be other than speech, and, if so, the potential constitutional
issues do not arise.
5. Intentional Interference with Existing Business/Employment
Relationship
This tort accords plaintiffs a claim against a defendant who
has unlawfully interfered with the plaintiffs contractual
relationship with another person. In the employment context,
the plaintiff must claim the defendant, a third-person, has
unlawfully interfered with the employment contract the plaintiff
had with her employer. The Montana Supreme Court has
recognized this tort and stated that the elements of proof are: (1)
that a contract was entered into; (2) that its performance was
refused; (3) that such refusal was induced by the unlawful and
malicious acts of the defendant; and (4) that damages have
144
resulted to the plaintiff.
The Montana Supreme Court has gone a step further,
holding that negligent interference (malice is not required) with
a contractual duty states a claim for relief. 145 The court, citing
Prosser, Law of Torts, states that negligent interference may
occur: (1) where a third party negligently interferes with a
plaintiffs contractual relationship with another (i.e., third party
142.

See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1010 (W. Page Keeton ed., West

Publishing 5th ed. 1984).
143. Id. at 1011. See also Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) (if
plaintiff is not a public figure, some degree of fault is required as to falsity); N.Y. Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (if plaintiff is a public figure, intentional or reckless
144.
145.

Phillips v. Mont. Ed. Ass'n., 187 Mont. 419, 423, 610 P.2d 154, 157 (1980).
Hawthorne v. Kober Const. Co., 196 Mont. 519, 522, 640 P.2d 467, 469 (1982).
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negligent interference with a plaintiffs employment contract
with the employer); or (2) where a contract is between a third
party and the employer, and that relationship creates a duty of
the third party to the plaintiff/employee. 1 46 For example, in the
latter instance, a defendant could enter into a contract with an
employer to supply materials that are necessary for the
employer to complete a project. A plaintiff may state a claim for
relief if the employer has hired the plaintiff to perform the
actual work on the project, and the defendant negligently fails to
deliver the materials to the employer, which results in the
47
plaintiff losing work and money.1
6. Fraud/Fraudulent Inducement IMisrepresentation
This claim for relief is based on the allegation that the
compensation the plaintiff was to receive, how his work was to
be assessed, or the other terms and conditions of his
employment (e.g., security or promised future benefits) were
misrepresented, either at the time of hire, or during the
employment relationship.
Montana has recognized claims for actual fraud,
constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.
a. Actual Fraud
The Montana Supreme Court has specified nine elements
for proof of actual fraud: 148 (1) a representation; (2) falsity of the
146. Id., 196 Mont. at 523-24, 640 P.2d at 470.
147. Id., 196 Mont. at 524, 640 P.2d at 470. The Hawthorne case was not an
employment case per se. The facts were: Kober Construction entered into a contract to
construct a building at the Billings Metra and contracted with PDM who was to furnish
steel for the construction. Id., 196 Mont. at 521, 640 P.2d at 469. The plaintiff,
Hawthorne, was hired by Kober to erect the building with the steel supplied by PDM.
id., 196 Mont. at 521, 640 P.2d at 469. Based on representations of PDM and Kober
regarding the delivery date of the steel, the plaintiff believed that it could start
construction in May or June. Id., 196 Mont. at 521, 640 P.2d at 469. Shipment of the
steel was not made until October, and it was shipped in the sequence promised. Id., 196
Mont. at 521, 640 P.2d at 469. As early as March, PDM and Kober knew that the steel
would not be available for shipment, but neither informed the plaintiff. Id., 196 Mont. at
521, 640 P.2d at 469. The plaintiff sued both Kober and PDM. Id., 196 Mont. at 521,
640 P.2d at 469. The court held: "by entering into a contract with Kober, PDM has
placed itself in such a relation toward Hawthorne, that the law will impose upon PDM
an obligation, sounding in tort, to act in such a way that Hawthorne will not be injured."
Id., 196 Mont. at 524, 640 P.2d at 470.
148. The elements for proof of actual fraud typically are:
a. A misrepresentation of existing material fact;
b. Made with knowledge of falsity;
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representation; (3) materiality of the representation; (4)
speaker's knowledge of the falsity of the representation or
ignorance of its truth; (5) speaker's intent that it should be
relied upon; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the
representation; (7) the hearer's reliance on the representation;
(8) the hearer's right to rely on representation; and (9)
consequent and proximate injury caused by the reliance on
149
representation.
For example, if the employer states facts that are known to
create a false impression, unless other facts are disclosed, the
plaintiff has a claim for fraudulent concealment or
nondisclosure. 150 Where an employer told employees that the
facility was growing, when a plan existed to close it, the
employees have
a claim of intentional
or reckless

misrepresentation. 151
b. ConstructiveFraud
Constructive fraud does not require all of the proof elements
of actual fraud. 152 While actual fraud hinges on a defendant's
153
knowledge and wrongful intent, constructive fraud does not.
Constructive fraud is present when a defendant, by words or
conduct, creates a false impression concerning important
154
matters and subsequently fails to disclose the relevant fact.
c. Negligent Misrepresentation
The elements of proof for the tort of negligent
misrepresentation are: (1) the defendant made a representation
as to a past or existing material fact; (2) the representation was
untrue, (3) regardless of actual belief, the defendant made the
representation without any reasonable grounds for believing it
c. An intention to induce plaintiff to rely;
d. Justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and
e. Damages.
See, e.g., Harrison v. Fred S. James, P.A. Inc., 558 F. Supp. 438, 442-43 (Pa. 1978).
149. Bartlett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 280 Mont. 63, 67, 929 P.2d 227, 231-32 (1996). See
also May v. ERA Landmark Real Estate of Bozeman, 2000 MT 299, 21, 302 Mont. 329,
21, 15 P.3d 1179, 21.
150. Berger v. Sec. Pac. Info. Sys. Inc., 795 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Colo. 1990).
151. Meade v. Cedarapids Inc., 164 F.3d 1218; 1221 (Or. 1999).
152. H-D Irrig. Inc. v. Kimble Properties, Inc., 2000 MT 212, 26, 301 Mont. 34,
26, 8 P.3d 95, 26 (the elements are stated in MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-406 (2003)).
153. Durbin v. Ross, 276 Mont. 463, 470, 916 P.2d 758, 762 (1996).
154. H-D Irrig., 25.
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to be true; (4) the representation was made with the intent to
induce the plaintiff to rely on it; (5) the plaintiff was unaware of
the falsity of the representation, acted in reliance upon the truth
of the representation, and was justified in relying upon the
representation; and (6) the plaintiff, as a result of its reliance,
sustained damage. 155
7. Prima Facie Tort
156
Montana does not recognize prima facie tort.

8. Negligent Retention/Supervision
"The tort of negligent retention arises when, during the
course of employment, the employer becomes aware or should
have become aware of problems with an employee [usually a
supervisor] that indicated his [or her] unfitness, and the
employer fails to take further action such as investigating,
discharge, or reassignment."' 157 The plaintiff, another employee,
alleges that, had the employer not been negligent, the other
work problems would not have occurred.
9. Invasion of Privacy
The common law right to privacy results in the following
tort actions: (1) appropriation of another's name or likeness; (2)
unreasonable publicity given to another's private life; (3)
publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light before
the public; and (4) an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion
58
of another.
The Montana Supreme Court had defined an invasion of
privacy as a "wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in
such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or

155. Yellowstone II Dev. Group, Inc. v. First Amer. Title Co., 2001 MT 41, 78, 304
Mont. 223, 78, 20 P.3d 755, 78, cited with approval in Osterman v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 2003 MT 327, 32, 318 Mont 342, 32, 80 P.3d 435, 32.
156. See Pospisil v. First Nat'l Bank of Lewistown, 307 Mont. 392, 37 P.3d 704
(2001). It is recognized that a prima facie tort exists where the defendant intends to
interfere with the plaintiffs economic interests, but "has done nothing that is otherwise
tortuous at all." Dobbs, supra note 130, § 45.
157. Bruner v. Yellowstone County, 272 Mont. 261, 269, 900 P.2d 901, 906 (1995)
(Leaphart, J., dissenting). See also McRae v. Martin Vaage & Norwest Mort., Inc., 18
Mont. Fed. Rptr. 342 (2002).
158. Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 377 (Colo. 1997).
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humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities."' 159
Determining whether the action is "wrongful" requires a balance
of the employer's legitimate business interests against the
invasion of employee privacy.
One possible plaintiffs' claim could involve an employer's
unlawful release of employment records or the disclosure of
other confidential information about the employee (e.g.,
unreasonable publicity given to another's private life or
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another).
a. UnreasonablePublicity Given to Another's Private Life
Unlike defamation, a cause of action for unreasonable
publicity requires disclosure of information about another's
private life.' 60 The cause of action usually arises when an
employer's agent discloses private information about the
For example, a claim may exist where an
plaintiff.
employer/former employer reports that the plaintiff cried and
was distraught upon learning that one of his numerous
grievances had been denied and discloses its conclusion that the
161
plaintiff had mental problems.
b. Tort for the Claim of False Light Invasion of Privacy
This claim has four elements: "(1) the publicizing of a
matter concerning another that (2) places the other before the
public in a false light, when (3) the false light in which the other
is placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(4) the actor knew of or acted in reckless disregard as to the
162
falsity of the publicized matter."'
c. Publicity that UnreasonablyPlaces Another in a False Light
Before the Public
The elements for a cause of action are: "(1) the defendant

159. Rucinsky v. Hentchel, 266 Mont. 502, 505, 881 P.2d 616, 618 (1994) (quoting
Sistock v. Northwestern Telephone Systems, Inc., 189 Mont. 82, 92, 615 P.2d 176, 182
(1980)).
160. Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Dev. Co., 339 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ill. 1975).
161. Bratt v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 130 (Mass. 1984).
162. Lence v. Hagadone Invest. Co., 258 Mont. 433, 444, 853 P.2d 1230, 1237 (1992),
overruled on other grounds in Sacco, 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411. The tort was applied
(2000) (plaintiff alleged that his employer made statements falsely implicating that he
was guilty of serious wrongdoing and that he posed a real threat to other employees).
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placed the plaintiff in a false light before the public; (2) the false
light would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3)
the defendant acted with knowledge or reckless disregard for the
163
falsity of the statement."
d. UnreasonableIntrusion upon the Seclusion of Another
These cases generally involve the employer who obtains
information from an employee where the employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Recently, these causes of
action often involve the employer monitoring employee activity
164
and communications (e.g., telephone, FAX, E-mail, etc.)
e. Lie Detector Tests
Montana prohibits employer lie detector tests. 165 Federal
law also prohibits employer use of lie detector tests on current
employees, except when the employer is investigating a specific

incident. 166

f. Telephone Surveillance of Employees Under Federal Law
The Federal Wiretapping Act provides that unconsented
interception and disclosure of communications over a telephone
can constitute an offense punishable by a $10,000 fine,
imprisonment, or both, and can subject the interceptor to civil
liability for compensatory and punitive damages. 167 The law
provides an exemption if interception is in "the ordinary course
of business."'168
However, because the parameters of the
business exemption are not clear, a business is well advised to
169
obtain employee consent as permitted under the law.
In addition to the statute, the Federal Communications

163.

Frobose v. Am. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 152 F.3d 602, 617 (Ill. 1998).

164.

Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992) (disclosure of employee's

conversations with her boyfriend).
165. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (2003).
166. Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2002, 2006(d) (1988). In such
a case, four specific requirements must be met. See id. § 2006(d).

167. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510, 2511, 2520, 2522 (2003).
168. See id. § 2510(5)(a)(1)(i).
169. Id. § 2511(2)(d) ("It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person"... to
intercept communication of an employee where the employee "has given prior consent to
such interception" unless the interception is "for the purpose of committing any criminal
or tortious act in violation of' state or federal law.).
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Commission ("FCC") has published a tariff rule, applicable to
interstate communications, that, when telephone conversations
are recorded, all parties to the conversation must give their
written consent to the conversation prior to the recording, or
oral consent must be obtained on the recording at the start of
the recording. Alternatively, a "beep-tone" repeated at intervals
of approximately fifteen seconds might by used when the
recording equipment is operating. Finally, Montana makes it a
crime to record human conversations without the knowledge of
all
parties 170
or
to
purposely
intercept
electronic
communications. 171 This criminal statute may serve as the basis
for a civil tort suit.
g. Privacy Issues Associated with E-mail
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986172
amends the Wiretapping Act 173 and provides against improper email interception, attempted interception, disclosure, use, and
unauthorized access. The Act reaches beyond common carriers
to include private communications systems used by many
employers. Civil relief includes compensatory and punitive
damages and attorney fees and costs. 1 74 Criminal penalties
1 75
include fines and imprisonment.
Again, the important exception is "consent" (i.e., whether
the employee consented to the interception or monitoring). An
employer may avoid the Act by informing employees that
communications will be monitored pursuant to a business
purpose. Even with notice to employees, the employer must
make sure that employees are not given a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" that some communications are to remain
"private." For example, material stored on computers when the
employee selects the password can implicate this issue. If the
employer does not want employee private information stored on
its computers, the employer must ensure it does not give
employees any "reasonable expectation of privacy."'176
170.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(l)(c) (2003).

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. § 45-8-213(2) (2003).
See id. §§ 2520, 2701 (2003).
See supra note 167.
18 U.S.C. § 2520(b).
See id. §§ 2511(4)(a), 2701(a).
1 7A
R It polF1~ga
q
EoAmei
Tn.., N. BC007036 (C-al. Sua.Ct., jan..
4, 1981) (dismissing employee's charges of improper e-mail interception based on another
statute, the Stored Wire and Electronic Communication and Transactional Records
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C. Negligence Actions-Preempted by the MWDA
Several tort actions have been recognized in other
jurisdictions, but appear to be preempted by the MWDA. The
preemption would be based on the argument that the claims are
intertwined with the discharge itself.
1. Right to FairProcedure
To state a cause of action, the plaintiff must prove denial of:
1. Adequate notice of the charges;
2. A reasonable opportunity to respond; and
177
3. Adverse action causing damages.
2. Negligent PerformanceAppraisal
The claim is based on the allegation that the employer
negligently failed to give the employee honest appraisals and
178
warnings.
3. Negligent Investigation
The claim is based on the employer's negligence in
performing an investigation of wrongdoing, which resulted in
79
the discharge.1
4. Negligent Record Keeping
The claim is based on the employer's negligent maintenance
1 80
of employment records, which resulted in the discharge.
5. Negligent Training
The claim is based on the employer's negligence in training
Access Act). However, the safe bet is for employers to inform employees that they have
no expectation of privacy regarding e-mail communications over company servers.
177. Pinsker v. Pac. Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 526 P.2d 253, 255 (Cal. 1977);
Ezekial v. Winkley, 572 P.2d 32, 35 (Cal. 1977).
178. Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1992). But
see Mitchell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 439 N.W.2d 261, 267 (Mich. App. 1989). Other courts
have refused to recognize the tort. See, e.g., Tollefson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 219
Cal. App. 3d 843, 857 (4th Dist. Div. 1 1990); Mann v. J.E. Baker Co., 733 F.Supp. 885,
888 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
179. See, e.g., Corbally v. Kennewick Sch. Dist., 973 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999) (refusing to recognize the tort).
180.
See, e.g., Prouty v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 572 F.Supp. 200, 206 (D.C.
1983) (refusing to recognize the tort).
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the plaintiff, which was the cause of the plaintiffs employmentrelated wrongdoing. 181
IV. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ISSUES
A. Employer Documentation-Developmentof Employee PoliciesDocumentationof Employee Performance & Rule Violations 8 2
1. Why Have Policies
Written policies and procedures (generally referred to as
"personnel policies," employment manuals, or employee
handbooks) can play a critical role in an employer's ability to
support disciplinary and discharge actions taken against an
employee. In Montana, employers are not required to have
personnel polices and procedures, but if they do, they are
required under the MWDA to follow the express provisions of
those policies. While there is some argument that an employer
who adopts written personnel policies and procedures risks
breaching the MWDA under Montana Code Annotated section
39-2-904(3), most employers recognize that written policies can
181. See, e.g., Budd v. Am. Sav. & Loan, 750 P.2d 513, 515 (Or. Ct. App. 1988)
(refusing to recognize the tort).
182. This subtopic of the article was written by Dr. Lynda L. Brown. Dr. Brown has
nearly thirty years of experience in the field of human resources management and career
development and is certified by the Society for Human Resource Management as a
-Senior Human Resource Professional (SPHR). She is an adjunct faculty member for the
School of Business at the University of Montana and teaches Strategic Human Resource
Management for the MBA program and for the Department of Marketing and
She owns her own management consulting practice, independently
Management.
consulting and training on a variety of human resource issues, and she serves as an
expert witness in discrimination and employment cases. Her work in organizational
and organizational behavior includes for-profit and non-profit
development
organizations.
Dr. Brown has a Ph.D. from Florida State University, an M.Ed. from the University
of Oklahoma, and a B.S. from the College of William and Mary. She holds a national
leadership position with the Society for Human Management (SHRM), the world's
largest professional association of human resource practitioners. She is currently a
member of SHRM's Board of Directors for the Human Resource Certification Institute
(HRCI). HRCI develops certification standards as well as the testing and training
materials for certifying human resource professionals worldwide. Dr. Brown is past
president of the SHRM Foundation, the Society's research and development arm. She
served as chair of the national Research Committee for SHRM and was appointed to the
task force that developed the Society's Code of Ethics. Dr. Brown worked with the
....
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She is widely published, including a chapter on performance appraisal in EFFECTIVE
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES (2d ed. 1996).
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communicate the employer's expectations about employee
performance and compliance with work rules. By committing
these expectations to writing, an employer can rely on them
later to demonstrate intent. If standards and rules are only
communicated verbally and are ill-defined, the employer is less
able to assert that they have been communicated consistently
and unambiguously to all the employees. By explicitly stating a
policy or expectation in a handbook or manual, the employer is
also communicating its importance to the effective operation of
the business.
Employers, without explicit policies and
standards, are also more vulnerable to arbitrary or capricious
enforcement by managers and supervisors.
An employer alleging a rule or policy violation on the part of
an employee needs to be able to reference a specific rule and to
confirm that the rule was communicated to the defendant. In
the absence of a written policy or standard, a discharged
employee can challenge its existence, question whether it serves
a legitimate business purpose, and rebut the employer's
argument regarding consistency in enforcement. In a decision to
terminate an employee because of conduct or performance, the
employer needs to point to clearly articulated performance
expectations, explain how actual performance is measured
against the standards, and defend how the standards are
important to the overall operation.
In addition, expert
witnesses, for both the plaintiff and the defendant, will rely on
the existence or absence of written policies and performance
standards in examining the circumstances of the termination
and the employer's past practice with respect to enforcement of
rules and standards with other similarly situated employees.
When employers adopt written policies and procedures in an
employee personnel manual or handbook, distributed to all
employees rather than scattered throughout a series of memos
or other documents, supervisors can readily point to the rule or
standard that has been violated. The employer can also link
other documentation, such as written warnings, performance
evaluations, written complaints, and training records to a
specific policy, standard, or procedure. Employees who have
signed a written acknowledgment of receipt of the rules and
standards of the employer will be less able to argue that the
expectations were not clear or communicated. uniformly.
2. Job Descriptionsand PerformanceStandards
While not considered policies per se, and not included in the
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/3
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policy handbook, written job descriptions and performance
standards also document communication with employees.
Section 39-2-903(5) of the MWDA defines "good cause" to include
In a wrongful
failure to satisfactorily perform job duties.
discharge claim, an employer who has to explain exactly how an
employee failed to perform satisfactorily will benefit from a
written list of job duties or a position description, along with
documented feedback to the employee about the execution of
those specific duties. Position descriptions should also describe
how the job fits into the operation of the business, making it
easier to justify how failure to meet performance standards is
linked to the effective operation of the business. The description
should include duties or standards expected of all employees,
based on the type of employer or work place, such as attendance,
appearance, teamwork, and customer service, as well as
requirements unique to the individual employee's job.
Written warnings, performance appraisals, or other
communication to the employee, with respect to unsatisfactory
performance, should refer to the job description and performance
standards and any efforts or resources expended to help the
If the job description and written
employee improve.
performance standards are signed by the employee, it will be
easier for the defendant to contend that the employee
understood the expectations of the employer with regard to job
performance.
Job descriptions should be used in conjunction with any
performance feedback, especially written evaluations, and when
poor performance is the cause for termination, job descriptions
are important in documenting any gaps between the employer's
expectations and the employee's actual performance on the job.
Job descriptions which define the essential functions of the
position are also important in defending claims of discrimination
or violations of the Family Medical Leave Act or Americans with
Disabilities Act.
3. Recommended Written Policies
Key policies and workplace rules should be committed to
writing and incorporated into a handbook or employee personnel
manual. Generally, more is not better, either with the number
of policies and procedures or level of detail. The policies should
be as concise as possible, stating only what is necessary, yet
unambiguous to the employee and easily administered by
supervisors and managers. Otherwise the employer invites the
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2005
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argument it failed to follow its own policies. Employers should
use language that is straightforward and avoid the use of words
that imply promises of fairness, equitable treatment, or
guarantees of long-term employment and job security.
Trying to capture the minute details of day-to-day-life in an
organization can be overwhelming to both employees and
supervisors and diminish the importance of the rules and
standards that need to be understood and complied with by all
employees. Pages and pages of dos and don'ts increase the
chances an obscure policy or procedure will be overlooked or
violated unintentionally, opening the door for a violation of
Montana Code Annotated section 39-2-904(1)(a)(3).
Written
rules and standards should provide the foundation of "good
cause," and a handbook or manual should include only policies
and procedures that, if not adhered to, will result in a disruption
of the employer's operation or constitute some other legitimate
business reason under Montana Code Annotated section 903(5).
At a minimum, in Montana, written policies should include:
Sexual harassment: describe the conduct that is prohibited,
reporting
requirements
and alternatives,
and privacy
expectations of both parties.
(Increasingly policies include
prohibitions against other forms of harassment (e.g., religious,
racial, etc.) and a policy of zero tolerance for workplace violence).
Policy statements: affirm compliance with state and federal
regulations, including non-discrimination (EEO), affirmative
action (if applicable), and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Grievance procedure: Montana Code Annotated section 39-2911(2) requires an employee to first access the employer's
internal complaint process before filing a MWDA action. The
grievance procedure doesn't have to be complex, and the time
frames should be realistic to avoid violating the provisions of the
policy. The employer has to ensure that a copy of the grievance
procedure is given to any terminated employees within seven
days of termination.
Termination payment provision: specify that the final
payment of wages will be made on the next regular payday or
fifteen days from separation, whichever occurs first, otherwise a
terminated employee must be paid immediately upon separation
from employment.
Drug testing policy: if the employer plans to conduct drug
tests, define the circumstances and specify that it will be done
pursuant to a qualified testing program (Montana Code
Annotated section 39-2-207) with written policies and
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/3
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procedures adopted sixty days before implementation.
Probationary period: unless the employer chooses a
probationary period of a different length, the MWDA stipulates
that the introductory/probationary period is six months.
However, to make sure it is clear to both supervisors and
employees, employers should specify the length of the
probationary period in the written policies even if it is not
different from the statutory six months.
Confidentiality: specify the need for and the scope of
confidentially expected of each employee regarding employer
interests that it seeks to keep confidential (e.g., trade secrets)
and employee interests (e.g., health records), which the
employer is to keep confidential.
Conflict of interest: specify the types of activities that might
constitute a conflict of interest and the process for reporting any
potential conflicts.
Compliance with Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA): for
employers with fifty or more employees within a seventy-five
mile radius, explain eligibility and the method for
documentation and computation of leave used (calendar year or
rolling twelve months) without summarizing the entire law.
Non-FMLA covered employers should specify if they have their
own leaves of absence policies.
Compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA):
state the intent to comply with provisions of wage and hour laws
and to correct any unintentional violations once brought to the
employer's attention.
Vacation and/or sick leave policies: explain how paid time
off is earned and accrued. In Montana, employers cannot have a
"use it or lose it" vacation accrual policy, but they may cap the
total number of hours that can be accrued.
General description of benefits and eligibility: avoid
describing the precise details of insurance coverage or the
retirement savings plan, but explain how to get more specific
information.
(for non-exempt
workweek
Pay
periods/paydays,
employees) and holiday schedules/eligibility: specify the
beginning and end of the workweek, policies about rest breaks
and meal periods, and other scheduling policies, including
flextime and telecommuting.
Use of employer property: use of computers, telephones
(in1iiding nprsnna! _nd business cell phone use. and safety
issues) along with an email/computer/internet policy, and
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2005
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privacy expectations/monitoring practices.
General rules of conduct: attendance and tardiness (what
constitutes job abandonment), appearance or dress code, conduct
of personal business/interruptions/visitors, smoking in the
workplace, substance abuse, and violence in the workplace.
Productive work environment expectations: state the
supervisor/co-worker/employee
necessity
for
business
cooperation.
Disciplinary/corrective action policy: provide a general
explanation of how misconduct or performance problems will be
addressed, while maintaining flexibility depending on the
specific circumstances. Avoid a laundry list of types of offenses
and expected punishment to avoid being locked into. a specific
response.
records: while there is no requirement for
Personnel
maintaining personnel records in Montana, having a central
repository for documents helps ensure that documentation on
employee conduct, including evaluations, will be available if
needed to defend a claim of wrongful termination. Specify
where such records will be maintained, their contents, and
access by the employee.
Acknowledgment of receipt of handbook and disclaimers:
include a signed notice of receipt acknowledging understanding
and acceptance of the standards and expectations as a condition
of employment, acknowledgment that the policies do not
constitute an employment contract, and a commitment to
maintain required confidentiality. Specify, the employer's right
to revise the policy and inform the employees of changes.
Written policies that clarify workplace rules helps eliminate
potential misunderstanding on the part of either the employee
The tone can be clear about the employer's
or employer.
expectations with regard to compliance without being overly
negative or threatening. Many employers adopt language in
their written policy manuals that conveys trust and mutual
respect.
B. Discovery
A plaintiffs discovery in a wrongful discharge suit, as in any
other suit, may rely upon production of documents,
interrogatories, requests for admissions, and depositions. With
a large employer who reduces decision making to writing,
production of documents is the leading form of discovery. It is
often recommended that demands upon the defendant to
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/3
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produce documents be filed with the service of the complaint.
Pursuant to Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1), a plaintiff
has three years "after filing a complaint to have a summons
issued and accomplish service." Accordingly, plaintiffs' counsel
may file a complaint to toll the short one-year statute-oflimitations of the MWDA18 3 and have plenty of time to prepare
and tailor a production of documents list.
The following are some sample production demands and
some sample interrogatories. Requests for admissions and
depositions are typically tailored to the information gained from
document productions and interrogatories. However, a plaintiff
may want to take a very early deposition of the person who
made the decision to discharge the plaintiff. From the outset, it
is often important to establish the reason for discharge and the
information the decision maker possessed at the time the
18 4
decision to terminate was made.
1. Productionof Documents
Counsel for plaintiffs should consider the following as
documents he or she may want to request for production:
1. Files kept by the defendant, including, but not limited to his
or her personnel file and files kept by the supervisor, department
manager or any other individual employed by the defendant.
Files described in Request #1 for similarly situated
2.
employees or witnesses who will be asked to testify.
3.
Files described in Request #1 for the person or persons who
were consulted, recommended or determined to discharge the
plaintiff.
4.
The plaintiffs payroll records during employment with the
defendant.
5.
All job descriptions for any position ever held by the plaintiff,
including any modifications thereof.
6.
All documents, formal or informal, which evaluate, assess,
describe or compare the performance of the plaintiff with other
employees or rate the plaintiffs performance relative to
performance standards.
7.
All documents that relate to employee benefits.
8.
All documents submitted to the decision maker(s) supporting
the decision to discharge/layoff the plaintiff.
9.
All documents relating to the decision to terminate/layoff the

183.
184.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911.
See disussion of after acquired evidence, infra pp. 393-96.
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plaintiff that were prepared by the decision maker, any
management personnel or anyone involved in the decision to
terminate or layoff.
10. All documents that relate to, or address, the plaintiffs
performance and/or employment rule violations, including
comments, counseling, warnings or discipline.
11. All documents which reflect awards, commendations, or other
positive notations concerning the plaintiffs work performance,
training, knowledge, education, ability, or other positive
attributes.
12, All documents which discuss or describe, in any way, the
reason or reasons for the plaintiffs discharge or layoff.
13. All documents which support defendant's position as to why
the plaintiff was selected for layoff or discharge.
14. All documents, including allegations, charges, investigations,
reports, memos, findings, directives, etc., related to any
wrongdoing by the plaintiff.
15. All documents that relate to any workplace, department,
work area, etc., reorganization and/or employee workforce/hour
reductions during the following time period:
16. All documents (including personnel and policy manuals,
handbooks, memorandum, or rule statements of procedure) which
address, reflect, or constitute defendant's rules regarding
personnel, employee, human resource policies, or practices of the
defendant for the following time period:
17. The name and hire date of all employees hired during the
following time period:
18. The name and date of all employees who were reassigned to
perform any duty, or duties, that the plaintiff performed prior to
his/her discharge/layoff.
19. All documents describing, or relating to, the process by which
the plaintiffs successor was selected, specifically including any
documentation regarding the recruiting, interviewing or selection
process, or the qualifications or selection guidelines used in
selecting the plaintiffs replacement.
20. The name and date of all employees who ceased employment
for any reason (discharge, layoff, voluntarily quit, reassignment,
etc.), three years prior to the plaintiffs discharge/layoff.
21. The name and date of all employees who ceased employment,
for any reason (discharge, layoff, voluntarily quit, reassignment,
etc.), since the discharge/layoff of the plaintiff.
22. The performance evaluations of all employees (or certain
prescribed employees) during the following time period:
23. The discipline records, including warnings, suspensions,
layoffs and discharges for all employees (or all employees working
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or assigned classifications) during the following time period:
24. All records pertaining to investigation and/or consideration of
discipline (warnings, suspensions, layoffs, and discharges) of all
employees (or certain prescribed employees) during the following
time period:
25. All documents relating to the plaintiffs claim, and the
defendant's position regarding such claim, for unemployment
compensation with the State of Montana.
26.

All documents which the defendant plans to use at trial.

2. Interrogatories
Counsel for plaintiffs should consider
interrogatories he or she may want answered:
1.

the

following

Identify the person answering these interrogatories.

2.
Why was the employment of (plaintiff) terminated? Please
state in precise detail each and every reason that played any role
in the termination decision and explain what role each factor
played.
During the entire time period (plaintiff) was employed by the
3.
defendant, was his/her work performance unsatisfactory? If the
answer is yes, please state:
a. Precisely what
unsatisfactory.

way

or

ways

his

performance

was

b. The dates or periods during which his performance is
alleged to have been unsatisfactory;
c. Is there is any documentation or evidence supporting the
claim of unsatisfactory performance and, if so, identify what it
is;
d. Identify all persons having knowledge of the alleged
unsatisfactory performance;
e. Whether (plaintiff) was ever warned, counseled or
disciplined in any way concerning the alleged unsatisfactory
performance and, if so, when, by whom, and in what form (i.e.,
oral warning, written disciplinary warning, suspension, etc.).
If your answer to this interrogatory is in the affirmative,
please produce any document, including any tape recording,
which relates in any way to such claimed warning.
4.
During the entire time period (plaintiff) was employed by the
defendant, did he or she violate work or employee rules? If so,
please state:
a.

What rules were violated?

b.

The dates or periods when the rule violations occurred?

c.

Whether

there

is

any

documentation
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supporting the claim of unsatisfactory performance and, if so,
identify what it is;
d. Identify all persons having knowledge of the alleged rule
violation;
e. Whether (plaintiff) was ever warned, counseled or
disciplined in any way concerning the alleged rule violation(s)
and, if so, when, by whom and in what form (i.e., oral warning,
written disciplinary warning, suspension, etc.). If your answer
to this interrogatory is in the affirmative, please produce any
document, including any tape recording, which relates in any
way to such claimed warning.
5.

Who decided to terminate (plaintiff)?

6.
Identify each person who participated in any way in the
decision to terminate (plaintiff) and, in connection with that
decision, describe in precise detail exactly what each person
identified did or said and when he or she did and/or said it.
7.
Identify the date of and participants in any meeting,
conversation, or discussion, however informal, at which the
termination or possible termination of (plaintiff) was discussed by
officers, managers, supervisors of the (defendant), and describe in
detail what was said and by whom.
8.
Precisely what were (plaintiffs) duties at the time of his/her
termination? If a job description exists which states the above
referenced job duties, please produce the job description in
addition to answering this interrogatory.
9.
How much was (defendant) paying (plaintiff) at the time of
termination?
10. Has (plaintiff) been replaced? If so, identify the person or
persons who replaced him. Further, as to any person or persons
whom (defendant) has employed or assigned to replace (plaintiff),
please provide a copy of any and all correspondence between
(defendant) and the person replacing (plaintiff), together with a
detailed description of his or her exact educational background,
work experience and other qualifications for the position. Finally,
state in precise detail exactly why (defendant) employed said
person or persons to replace (plaintiff).
11. If (plaintiff) was replaced, state the duties of (plaintiffs)
replacement.
12.

How much is (defendant) paying (plaintiffs) replacement?

13. Identify every person terminated by the (defendant) from
January 1, [year] to date, specifying each person's name, age, date
of birth, position, duties, date of termination, reasons for
termination and salary/wage at termination. In addition, for each
person identified, state whether his or her duties were reassigned
to others (including new hires and/or then existing employees). If
duties were reassigned, identify the person or persons to whom
they were reassigned, specifying (in addition to all of the
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information requested above) the date on which such duties were
assumed, the reason for reassigning the duties, and the salary of
the person(s) assuming such duties.
14. Please provide a list of all full-time employees as of January
1 and June 1 of each year since [year], stating each employee's
name, date reported, position or job title, date of hire, and
salary/wage as of date of reporting.
15. During the period from January 1, [year] through the
present, was, or is, there any business or general liability
insurance in force covering you and/or your business? If so, state
as to such insurance coverage: (a) the name and address of each
insurance company; (b) the number of each policy; (c) the limits of
liability stated in each policy; and (d) the name and address of the
local agent for each such policy.
16. Identify any witnesses you believe may have any information
concerning any issues in this lawsuit and provide a detailed
description of the information you believe them to have.
17. Identify any witnesses you expect to call at the trial of this
matter.
18. Identify any exhibits you plan to use at trial.
19. Identify any documents, which you believe contain
information, relating in any way to any issue in this litigation.

C. Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings & Rule 56
Motion for Summary Judgment
Under Rule 12(c) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, a
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings may be made by either
party after the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not
to delay the trial. If such a motion is accompanied by matters

outside

the

pleadings

(e.g.,

depositions,

answers

to

interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, etc.), the motion shall be
treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment under Montana
Rule of Civil Procedure 56.185
It is quite common for a defendant or former employer to
seek either a motion for judgment on the pleadings or, even
more likely, a motion for summary judgment. The burden of
proof is on the moving party to demonstrate entitlement to
judgment,1 8 6 and all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in

185. Am. Med. Oxygen Co. v. Mont. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 232 Mont. 165, 167, 755 P.
2d 37, 39 (1988).
186. Mathews v. Glacier Gen. Assurance Co., 184 Mont. 368, 378, 603 P.2d 232, 238
(1979).
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favor of the party opposing summary judgment.18 7 The Montana
Supreme Court has stated:
[S]ummary judgment is appropriate when 'the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.' The initial burden rests upon
the moving party, who may rely upon the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and affidavits to
establish that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact. The
burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion. That is, the
adverse party must respond to the summary judgment motion,
and 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.' If the adverse party does not so respond, 'summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse
party.'
[Summary judgment] ...is properly granted to the moving party
if the adverse party fails to respond with specific facts showing
that a genuine issue exists as to a material fact ....

[E]vidence

sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, 'must be in
proper form and conclusions of law will not suffice; the proffered
evidence must be material and of a substantial nature, not
fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or suspicious.' 188

Evidence that the asserted reason for discharge is "false or
pretextual" may satisfy a plaintiffs burden.1 8 9 Once the court
determines there is a material question of fact, the motion must
be denied. 90 A material fact "is one which is relevant to an
element of a claim or defense, and its materiality is determined
by the substantive law governing the claim or defense."'19
1. Summary Judgment in the Context of Plaintiff's Lack of
"Good Cause"Allegation
In the event a plaintiff pleads that the discharge 192 was

187. Meyer v. Creative Nail Design, Inc., 1999 MT 74, 15, 294 Mont. 46, 9 15, 975
P.2d 1264, 15.
188. Old Elk v. Healthy Mothers, Healthy Babies, Inc., 2003 MT 167, 99 15-16, 316
Mont. 320, I 15-16, 73 P.3d 795, 9 15-16. See also Schillo v. Avista Communication of
Mont., 30 Mont. Fed. Rept. 436 (2002).
189. Delaware v. K-Decorators, Inc., 1999 MT 13, 58, 293 Mont. 97, 58, 973 P.2d
818, 58.
190. It is for the jury, not the court, to resolve the question of fact. Andrews v.
Plumb Creek Mfg., 2001 MT 94, 21, 305 Mont 194, 21, 27 P.3d 426, 21.
191. Local Union No. 206, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Qwest Corp., 30 Mont. Fed.
Rep. 543 (2003). For an interesting summary judgment case, see Cole, 2005 MT 21, 325
Mont. 388, __ P.3d .
192. For a case regarding a defendant's motion for summary judgment in a
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without "good cause," the defendant may seek dismissal based
on the allegation that the plaintiff committed a rule violation,
the plaintiff was guilty of a performance failure, the plaintiff
disrupted the employer's operation, or there was a legitimate
business reason for the plaintiffs dismissal (e.g., economic
slowdown, business reorganization, contracting work out,
etc.). 193 In the event of such a motion, the plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) General Denial-there was no plaintiff
misconduct (e.g., the plaintiff did not commit a rule violation or
have a performance failure) nor were there any other alleged
"legitimate business reasons" (e.g., there was no economic
slowdown, reorganization, contracting-out, etc); (2) Pretext-the
defendant's alleged reason for discharge (e.g., employee
misconduct or other legitimate business reason) may have
occurred, but it is asserted by the defendant merely as pretext to
hide the real, impermissible reason for discharge; 194 and (3)
Unreasonableness or mitigating factors-the defendant's alleged
reason(s) for discharge may have occurred, but they are not
"reasonable job related grounds for dismissal" (e.g., there existed
mitigating factors or mitigating circumstances that made the
discharge unreasonable). 195
a. Basic Denial-PlaintiffCommitted No Misconduct Nor Was
There Other Legitimate Business Reasons for the Discharge
A plaintiffs first allegation may be general denial, that is, she is
not guilty of misconduct (e.g., did not commit a rule violation or
performance failure, nor is there "other legitimate business
reason" to justify her discharge). Consequently, there is a
substantial fact question whether the reasons asserted for the
discharge are "false, or arbitrary or capricious." The truth or
falsity of the employer's allegation presents a question of fact to

"constructive discharge" case, see Bellanger v. Am. Music Co., 2004 MT 392,
12, 325
Mont. 222, 12, 104 P.3d 1075, 12.
193. Buck v. Frontier Chevrolet Co., 248 Mont. 276, 280-81, 811 P.2d 537, 540
(1991).
194. Kelly v. Fed. Express Corp., 28 Mont. Fed Repts. 135, 147 (2001) ("Legitimacy
is negated if the reason given for the discharge is invalid as a matter of law, [or] if it
rests on a mistaken interpretation of the facts ....
").
195. Id. at 147 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (1999)). The allegation of
unreasonableness/mitigati nn is that, while a plaintiff may admit to some employment

related misconduct or acknowledge there was an economic slowdown, her discharge was
unreasonable, and, therefore, unlawful, because of the existence of mitigating factors.
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be resolved by the jury.1 96
b. Pretext-PlaintiffMay Acknowledge Misconduct or Other
Business Reason, but Assert this is Not the Real Reason for
Discharge
A plaintiff may also argue that the defendant's charge of
misconduct, or other legitimate business reason, may or may not
be true. However, it is not the real reason for the discharge and
is being asserted only to conceal some other illegitimate reason.
Courts have recognized "pretext" as a legitimate basis for
defeating a defendant's allegation of "good cause."19 7 Evidence of
pretext is sufficient to defeat a defendant's motion for summary
judgment because it presents a question of fact to be resolved by
a jury. 198
The jury is always permitted to determine the
employer's true reason for discharging the employee.
An
example from this category would be where an employer charges
an employee with misconduct in an effort to conceal that the real
reason for discharge was animosity, which is unrelated to job
performance.199
c. Unreasonableness/Mitigating
Factors
A plaintiffs third argument may be to acknowledge some
misconduct on the plaintiffs part, or the existence of some other

196. Id. ("Legitimacy' is negated if the reason given for the discharge is invalid as a
matter of law, [or] if it rests on a mistaken interpretation of the facts...") (citing Marcy
v. Delta Airlines, 166 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 1999)). See also Toussaint v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 896 (Mich. 1980).
The allegation of pretext is that the employee may or may not have been guilty of
misconduct or there was a "legitimate business reason," but that reason(s) is asserted by
the defendant to conceal an otherwise illegitimate reason for the discharge.
For
example, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff had performance failures. The plaintiff
may acknowledge such failures, but claim that they are asserted only to cover for the
real and impermissible reason for discharge (e.g., the discharge was because as coach of
the after-school little league team on which the defendant's daughter plays, the plaintiff
did not coach and/or play the daughter to the satisfaction of the defendant). Or
alternatively, the defendant alleges that it experienced an economic slowdown which
necessitated the layoff of the plaintiff. The plaintiff may acknowledge the slowdown, but
claim the real reason for the discharge was not the slowdown, but because of his
treatment of the defendant's daughter on the little league team.
197. Kelly, 28 Mont. Fed. Repts. at 147 ("Legitimacy' is negated if the reason given
for the discharge is ...merely a pretext for some other illegitimate reason").
198. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 896.
199. Buck, 248 Mont. at 281-82, 811 P.2d at 540 (explaining that good cause must
be based on a job related grounds for dismissal and "have some logical relationship to the
needs of the business").
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valid business reason, but that the situation did not constitute
"reasonable" job related grounds for dismissal. The plaintiff
may argue the presence of mitigating factors that present a
substantial fact question whether the discharge was
unreasonable, without a "legitimate business reason," or was
"arbitrary or capricious." Mitigating factors may include:
The employer failed to properly inform the employee of its
i.
expectations (e.g., performance standards and/or rules) and the
consequence of not fulfilling those expectations. Employees have
the right to be properly informed of the employer's rules and
expectations and the consequence of not fulfilling those
expectations before being discharged.
ii. The rule or performance standard that the employee violated
was not reasonably related to the needs of the enterprise. Rules
and performance standards not reasonably related to the
employer's needs impose unrealistic expectations on employees
and discharge for failure to perform in conformity with such
expectation is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and without a
legitimate business reason.
iii. The employer failed to discharge other employees with
similar conduct (i.e., disparate treatment). Employees have the
right to consistent and predictable20 0employer responses to rule
violations and performance failures.
to provide the employee with proper
iv. The employer failed
20 1
training or supervision.
v. The "employer may be liable for negligence in violating its
own written employment policies [negligent reduction in
[of the
workforce] or for failing to make a proper investigation
20 2
employees alleged misconduct] before discharge."
vi. Minor violations or performance failures by an otherwise
acceptable employee absent prior warnings or other discipline. It
may not be considered a "reasonable job related ground for
dismissal" to discharge an otherwise acceptable employee for a
first time, minor offense or performance failure. While the
Montana Supreme Court has determined that the concept of "good

200. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 897 (stating "[a]n employer who only selectively
enforces rules or policies may not rely on the principle that a breach of a rule is [cause
for discharge], there being in practice no real rule.").
7, 15-16, 305 Mont. 194,
201. See Andrews v. Plumb Creek Mfg., 2001 MT 94,
7, 15-16 (claiming that employer failed to provide adequate
7, 15-16, 27 P.3d 426,
training, written job standards, job evaluations, supervision, and disciplinary warnings);
Marcy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 18 Mont. Fed. Repts. 391 (1994) (dealing with employee
discharge for mistakes in a time-keeping system, which was shown to be imperfect and
poorly administered).
2002.

Ezr
...

S

21
r-,

11-o.+

100

210,

94 P.2

29l
0'6

(1991)

(nitini

Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 221 Mont. 419, 720 P.2d 257 (1986);
Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 213 Mont. .488, 693 P.2d 487 (1984)).
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cause," as used in the MWDA, does not include the requirement of
progressive discipline as a matter of law, 203 its use by employers
certainly addresses the requirement that the employer have a
"reasonable" ground for dismissal. As a fact issue, it may be
unreasonable to discharge an otherwise good employee for a first
time, minor rule violation or performance problem. Such a
situation presents a substantial issue of fact that should be
presented to the jury.
vii. It may not be considered "reasonable job related grounds for
dismissal" if the employer "provokes" the employee's wrongful
conduct that the employer then relies upon to justify the
discharge. 20 4 A common situation is where an employer "badgers"
an employee, provoking an incident for which the employee is
Because the
charged with insubordination and discharged.
the
provoked
insubordination,
employer
improperly
20 5
insubordination was not good cause for discharge.

D. Proving & Defending: The Role of Motive and Causation
As noted above, the MWDA creates three claims for relief
against a former employer arising out of a discharge: (1) where a
non-probationary employee is discharged in absence of "good
cause"; (2) where an employee is discharged for violation of the
employer's "own written personnel policy"; and (3) where an
employer retaliates against an employee for refusal to violate a
public policy" or for "reporting a violation of public policy."
Motive plays an important role in "public policy" and "good
cause" claims, but it has no role in "personnel policy" claims.
However, "causation" is an important element in "personnel
policy" claims (e.g., the personnel policy violation resulted in the
discharge).

1. PersonnelPolicy Claims
When a plaintiffs unlawful
former employer with violating
policy," the employer's motive
discharge is unlawful if it is

discharge claim chares the
its "own written personnel
is irrelevant, that is, the
inconsistent with a written

203. See Miller v. Citizens State Bank, 252 Mont. 472, 830 P.2d 550 (1992).
204. See Elliott v. Shore Stop, Inc., 384 S.E.2d 752 (Va. 1989); Heller v. Champion
Int'l Corp., 891 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989).
205. See Soliz v. Great Western Bank, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (Cal. App. 4th 1998)
(stating that where employee's own improper conduct creates employer animosity,
employee may not be permitted to contest his discharge based on improper employer
animosity).
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personnel policy irrespective of motive. 20 6 Whether the former
employer knew of the policy, knew that it was acting
inconsistently with the policy, or even cared, is totally
irrelevant. 20 7 If discharge was inconsistent with the policy, it is
unlawful.
However, the issue of causation is important. The mere
existence of a policy violation in the context of a discharge does
not make the discharge unlawful unless the plaintiff
demonstrates that there is a "causal" link between the personnel
policy violation and the cause for discharge. The plaintiff must
demonstrate not merely that she was discharged at a time when
the employer was violating or had violated its own written
personnel policies, but that there was a causal link between the
employer's violation and the discharge.
For example, if the employer's written personnel policies
require an employer to perform periodic employee evaluations,
and the employer fails to do so, discharging an employee for
"poor performance" may be unlawful because, if the employer
had periodically evaluated the employee, the employee would
have known of any deficiencies and could have self-corrected.
Alternatively, if the same employee was discharged for "theft" or
for an unprovoked or otherwise unprivileged workplace "battery
of a supervisor," there may be no "causal connection" between
the employer's failure to evaluate the employee and the cause
for discharge. Thus, for personnel policy claims, there must be a
causal link between the personnel rule and the reason for
discharge. Certainly, if the employee were discharged for theft
from a cash register and the employer failed to follow two of its
own written policies (e.g., to annually provide "sexual
harassment training" and its procedure for delivering the
employee's last paycheck) that have no causal link to the cause
of discharge, the personnel policy rule violations would not
20 8
constitute a proper claim for relief.

206. The Act provides that a discharge is wrongful if "the employer violated the
express provisions of its own written personnel policy." MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(c).
There is no requirement of wrongful intent or motive. See id.
207. See Dobbs, supra note 130, § 166 ("plaintiff must prove not merely that she
suffered harm sometime after the defendants act occurred, but that the harm was caused
in fact by the defendant's conduct.").
208. The question of causation may involve a legitimate question of fact, and, if so, a
trial court should not enter a motion to dismiss for summary judgment. If there is a
material question of facLt, buch a6 u uaua 1 .inkbetween the e.ployer's fanill-

to follw

its own written personnel policies and the cause for discharge, the motion should be
denied and the matter submitted to a jury. See, e.g., Soliz, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696.
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2. Public Policy Retaliation Claims: Single and Dual Motives
If a plaintiffs claim for relief is that the employer retaliated
against him for "refusal to violate a public policy" or for
"reporting a violation of public policy," the plaintiff must prove
the "motive" for the discharge was retaliation for either "refusal
to violate a public policy" or for "reporting a violation of public
209
policy."
It is possible that the employer will only deny the plaintiffs
allegation, and the issue is whether the plaintiff can prove the
impermissible motive (e.g.,. the discharge was because the
plaintiff refused to violate public policy) in a single motive case.
However, typically, the employer will offer an alleged
"legitimate" motive for the discharge (e.g., the reason for the
discharge was the plaintiffs poor performance). In that event,
the trier-of-fact will be presented with two motives: a lawful
motive (e.g., poor performance) and an unlawful motive (e.g.,
retaliation for "refusal to violate a public policy" or for "reporting
a violation of public policy"). This is a "dual motive" case.
3. Good Cause Claims: Single and Dual Motives •
Similarly, if a plaintiffs claim for relief is that the employer
lacked "good cause" for the discharge, the issue of "motive" plays
an important role.
To demonstrate "good cause," the employer must articulate
and offer evidence that it had "reasonable job related grounds
for dismissal" or that there was some other legitimate business
reason-a permissible motive. 210
If the plaintiff does not
challenge the employer's motive, but challenges the accuracy of
the allegation (e.g., he was not a poor performer, and/or his level
of performance was not reasonable job related grounds for
dismissal) the case is referred to as a "single motive" case.
Alternatively, if the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's
asserted motive is pretext (e.g., not worthy of belief) and
attempts to demonstrate that another "impermissible" motive
(e.g., non-job related) was the real reason for the discharge (e.g.,
that the plaintiff had a non-work related conflict with his

209. The Act does not make all retaliatory discharges unlawful, only those based on
the employee's refusal to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public policy.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(a). Consequently, a retaliatory discharge is unlawful only
when motivated.
210. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5).
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supervisor's father-in-law) the case presents two motives for the
discharge, and is thus considered a "dual motive" case.
4. Proofof Dual Motive Cases: The Same Decision Test
The United States Supreme Court has determined that, in a
dual motive case, where the trier-of-fact has to choose between a
permissible employer motive (e.g., poor work performance) and
an impermissible motive (e.g., gender discrimination): (1) if the
plaintiff demonstrates that "a motivating factor" for the adverse
action was impermissible (e.g., gender discrimination), the
plaintiff wins, unless (2) the defendant proves (the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant) that it would have made the "same
decision" (e.g., taken the adverse action based on the permissible
motive). 211 The Montana Supreme Court has relied on this
212
analysis.
The "dual" or "mixed motive" proof mechanism applies in
employment disputes where the law makes impermissible
certain employer motives (e.g., gender, age, race, disability,
union membership, etc.). The question becomes whether the
employer's adverse action was impermissibly motivated or
213
whether it was permissibly motivated (e.g., employee theft).
Because a MWDA "good cause" claim does not involve an
issue of employer "impermissible motive," the "dual" or "mixed
motive" proof mechanism does not apply. Thus, the "burden of
proof' is always on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
employer did not have "good cause" for the discharge. There is
no issue regarding the presence or absence of an impermissible
motive. Either the employer had "good cause" or did not.
Alternatively, if the plaintiff alleges that she was
discharged in retaliation for refusal to violate public policy or for
reporting a violation of public policy, the plaintiff alleges an

211. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (42
U.S.C. 1983 free speech case); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989)
(Title VII gender discrimination case); NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S.
393, 401-03 (1983) (mixed/dual motive cases under the National Labor Relations Act
involving employer discrimination against employees for union activity or protected
concerted activity; under the NLRA the employer escapes all liability by proving that it
would have made the "same decision" even if the employee had not been involved in
protected activities).
212. Bd. of Trs. v. State ex. rel. Bd. Pers. Appeals, 185 Mont. 89, 102, 604 P.2d 770,
777 (1979) (affirming Board of Personnel Appeals reliance on the Mt. Healthy dual
uluive

Lus.

Hi a udt
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competence; and (2) protected union activity).
213. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274.
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impermissible motive. 214 If the plaintiff can prove that "a
motivating" factor for her discharge was impermissible
retaliation, the plaintiff should win unless the defendant can
establish that it would have made the same decision in absence
of the impermissible motive (e.g., discharged the plaintiff
anyway because of some permissible motive, such as theft).
E. Evidence-Use of Experts, Hearsay, Service Letters and AfterAcquired Evidence
1. Use of Expert Witnesses
Both plaintiffs and defendants in a wrongful discharge case
often rely on expert testimony to demonstrate the discharge was
or was not for "good cause," violated the defendant's "own
written personnel policy," or was for unlawful retaliation.
However, the Montana Supreme Court has directed that experts
may not invade the province of the fact finders and give a
conclusion on the ultimate question of law (e.g., whether the
discharge was or was not for "good cause"). The court does allow
an expert to testify whether the employer violated its own
2 15
written personnel policy.
Expert witnesses are allowed to testify to a broad array of
matters.
They can testify to matters such as a specific
employer's employment guidelines and policies, common
practices in different businesses and industries, the appropriate
standards of conduct for a particular type of employer or
employee, etc. In Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconness Hospital,
the Montana Supreme Court held "Rule 702 [of the Montana
Rules of Evidence] does not exclude expert testimony on all
matters about which jury members have any knowledge... [and
that] [t]he trier of facts' experience [did] not extend to Hospital
disciplinary guidelines, much less the ability to evaluate the
propriety of such guidelines." 2 16 The court went on to state that
the expert's testimony "assisted the jury to understand the
evidence and ultimately the [legal issue in question]."217
While the scope of an expert's testimony is broad, it is
214.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(a).

215. Jarvenpaa v. Glacier Elec. Coop., 1998 MT 306, 1 32-33, 292 Mont. 118, 11
32-33, 970 P.2d 84,
32-33 (an expert may testify as to whether the personnel policy
was violated, but not to whether the policy existed).
216. 213 Mont. 488, 502-04, 693 P.2d 487, 494 (1984).
217. Id., 213 Mont at 504, 693 P.2d at 494.
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limited to ultimate factual issues of the case. 218 An expert is not
allowed to testify to the ultimate legal issues of the case; those
issues must be left to the jury to decide. In Kizer v. Semitool,
the Montana Supreme Court discussed the distinction between
legal and factual issues and points out that "[t]he admission of
such testimony would give the appearance that the court was
219
shifting to witnesses the responsibility to decide the case."
The distinction between ultimate fact and ultimate legal
conclusion was illustrated by the Montana Supreme Court in
Heltborg v. Modern Machinery:
To clarify, had Modern provided its employees with a handbook or
policy requiring advance notice before termination, and requiring
severance pay, an expert could testify to the factual issues of
whether the employer followed its own policies. Nonetheless, the
expert could not follow this testimony with a legal conclusion in
whether the employer violated the covenant of good faith and fair
220
dealing.

2. Hearsay Evidence
A common situation involving the hearsay rule arises when
the employer attempts to introduce records/documents of the
The
plaintiffs rule violations or performance deficiencies.
22 1
hearsay.
are
records
the
that
is
objection
plaintiffs
typical
The employer often relies on these records because: (1) the
supervisor who was involved in the alleged misconduct is no

218. Jarvenpaa, 32. In Jarvenpaa, the court determined that the district court
was correct in refusing to allow an expert to testify as to the existence of a written
The expert was allowed "to identify common management
personnel policy. Id.
standards and discuss whether such standards were evident in the materials supplied by
Glacier's management consultant." Id. He was also allowed to testify to whether Glacier
violated a personnel policy, assuming one could be established. Id.
219. Kizer, 251 Mont. 199, 206, 824 P.2d 229, 233 (citing MCcORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 12 (Edward W. Cleary ed., West Publ'g 3d ed. 1984)). The court concluded that the
expert's testimony as to whether Semitool had breached the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing constituted a legal conclusion on the exact issue that was to be decided by
the jury. Kizer, 251 Mont. at 207, 824 P.2d at 233.
220. Heltborg v. Modern Mach., 224 Mont. 24, 31, 795 P.2d 954, 958 (1990). See
also Mahan v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., 235 Mont. 410, 421, 768 P.2d 850, 857 (1989)
(holding that a statistician may testify that his statistical tests show or do not show
patterns of discrimination, but may not testify to the ultimate conclusion that
discrimination was or was not exercised in the specific termination at issue).
221. "Hearsay is a 'statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.'
Rule 801(c). M.R.Evid. Hearsay evidence is not admissible unless an exception applies.
Rule 802, M.R.Evid." State v. Struble, 2004 MT 107, 96, 321 Mont. 89, 96, 90 P.3d

971,

96.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2005

59

388

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 66 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 3

Vol. 66

longer with the employer or is otherwise unavailable to testify;
or (2) to bolster the testimony of the supervisor/s who testifies.
The hearsay objection may be handled in either of two ways:
a. The Hearsay Objection-The Document is Admitted Only for
the Reason, Not the Truth
First, if the defendant's proposed exhibit is introduced only
for the purpose of demonstrating the "reason" for its adverse
action against the plaintiff, and not for the "truth of the mater
asserted," the document is not hearsay (i.e., the document is
solely for the purpose of showing "why" the defendant
discharged the plaintiff, not to demonstrate that it had "good

cause" to do

so).222

222. If the evidence is not offered to prove the "truth of the matter asserted," the
evidence is not subject to a hearsay objection. Often the employer documents the reason
the plaintiff was discharged. Introduction of this document, if its only purpose is to
establish the reason for the discharge, and not the truth of the alleged reason, is not
hearsay.
In the age discrimination case of Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 793 F.2d 1321
(1982), "Sears introduced a series of memoranda prepared by Moore's supervisors over a
period of months." Id. at 1322. These memos contained "observations pertaining to
Moore's performance, summaries of reports about his performance made by other Sears
employees, and chronological accounts of events such as personnel investigations and
Several of the persons whose reports were reflected in the memos
meetings." Id.
testified. Id. Moore's attorney contended that these documents constituted hearsay. Id.
The trial court admitted the documents and Moore appealed. Id. The court of appeals
held that the documents were properly admitted and did not constitute hearsay because
they were not offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted. Id. The court stated
that, "[t]he documents ... were not tendered to prove the particulars of their contents,
but to help establish that Sears was motivated, in good faith, to discharge Moore for
reasons other than age." Id. at 1322-23.
In another age discrimination case, Crimm v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 750 F.2d 703 (1984),
Crimm argued on appeal that handwritten notes and an investigative report prepared by
one of his supervisors, which was based on the supervisor's observations and
conversations with Crimm and others, had been erroneously admitted into evidence
under the business records exception. Id. at 709. The appellate court held that the
The
argument was without merit because the documents were not hearsay. Id.
documents were offered simply to demonstrate that Missouri Pacific had conducted an
investigation and to disclose the information Missouri Pacific relied on in making its
decision. Id.
Similarly, in the Minnesota wrongful discharge case of Hardie v. Cotter & Co., 849
F.2d 1097 (1988), Hardie objected to the admission of portions of his personnel file,
"which included customer complaints regarding Hardie's work habits." Id. at 1101. He
asserted that the documents were hearsay. Id. On appeal, the court held that the
"objects were not offered to prove the truth of the material contained within them, but to
demonstrate the state of mind of Cotter personnel who made the decision to discharge
Hardie, a factor of crucial importance in wrongful discharge cases," and "[t]he challenged
exhibits were properly admitted to establish Hardie's supervisors' understanding of the
circumstances existing at the time of his discharge." Id.
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b. Hearsay-The Business Records Exception
Second, if the purpose for the introduction of the exhibit is
to establish that the plaintiff committed a rule violation or
performance deficiency, the document may possibly be admitted
under the exception for "business records/records of regularly
conducted activity."
This exception to the hearsay rule states:
Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnosis, made at or near the time of the
acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnosis, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the
regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by
the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless
or circumstances of
the source of information or the method 223
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.

Business records "are presumed reliable for two general
reasons: 1) employees generating these records are motivated to
accurately prepare these records because their employer's
business depends on the records to conduct its business affairs;
and 2) the routine and habit of creating these records also lends
reliability." 224 To be admissible, a business record must "report
information concerning a primary business activity of the
business for which there is a duty and a motive to report
truthfully. '225 When a document is prepared for use outside
normal business operations, especially for use in litigation, it
226
does not support the presumption of reliability.
In Bean v. Montana Board of Labor Appeals, the hearings
referee, in an unemployment compensation hearing, admitted,
over objection, a report prepared by the social services director
for a nursing home regarding the performance of one of its
licensed practical nurses. 227 The report was based, not on the

There is also a Washington Court of Appeals case, Subia v.Redmond, 15 P.3d 658
(Wash. 2001), which cites Hardie in a footnote. Subia, 15 P.3d at 116, n.11. The court
held that the results of a polygraph test taken by Subia were relevant and admissible to
prove the Department of Correction's state of mind when it dismissed Subia to establish
a non-discriminatory reason for the discharge. Id. at 116.
223. MoNT. R. EVID. 803(6) (2004).
224. Bean v. Mont. Bd. of Labor Appeals, 1998 MT 222, 20, 290 Mont. 496, 20,
965 P.2d 256, 20.

225.
226.
227.

Id. 27.
Id. 23.
Id. 9.
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personal knowledge of the social services director, but on
information she received from the daughter of a "resident"
concerning alleged misconduct of the nursing home's
employees. 228 It was undisputed that the report was hearsay
evidence: the issue was whether the report was properly
admitted as a business record. 229 The Montana Supreme Court
determined that the report was not a "business record," and was
not exempt from the hearsay rule because: (1) the report was not
prepared as part of the employer's routine business activity,
rather, it was prepared as part of disciplining employees, an
activity incidental to its main business activity; and (2) the
report itself contained a hearsay statement of the daughter, a
third party, who was not charged with accurately collecting or
230
documenting information for the employer.

228. Id. 8.
229. Id. 16.
230. Bean, 7 23-24. But see Chief Justice Grey's dissent which states:
[Tlhe Court's suggestion that the Incident Report is not a "business record"
ignores the actual working of the rule and also ignores the reality that
personnel records-including complaints about employees-are regularly kept
and serve legitimate business purposes which have noting to do with
anticipated litigation. The Incident Report at issue clearly was kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity and it was the regular
practice of the business to make the report. No more need be said about that
portion of Rule 803(6), M.R. Evid. Indeed, in my opinion, it is neither
necessary nor wise to engage in the unproductive exercise of trying to
determine how closely related a purported business record is to the main
business activity of the enterprise in discussing and applying this Rule.
...Businesses operate through their employees. Moreover, a business like
[the nursing home], which is-in the Court's words-in the 'routine business
activity of administering nursing services to elderly residents,' can hardly
remain in business without competent and courteous employees who discharge
the services in manner acceptable to both the elderly residents and their
visiting loved ones. A complaint about an employee, written up into an
Incident Report, is an integral part of the business activity as it enables the
business to better provide the services for which it is engaged by training and
counseling its employees and, where necessary, disciplining them for conduct
which does not measure up to expectations.
46-47.
Id.
On this point, the Chief Justice may have the better position. As a normal business
activity, employers compile and keep such "incident" reports for the purpose of training,
counseling, and potentially disciplining employees. An employer cannot be expected to
deliver a product or service, or to even remain in business, with employees who exhibit
poor performance or violate legitimate employment rules. To that extent, these records,
when otherwise trustworthy, should be admitted under the business records exception,
and the parties left to argue to its weight. Ultimately, the question is whether the record
is of the type that is trustworthy, or whether it is just a document prepared to support
employer conduct.
The Chief Justice concurred with the majority and said that, in this case, the
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Thereafter, in State v. Struble, the Montana Supreme Court,
in a criminal case regarding a State prison employee charged
with falsifying payroll records, determined that the prosecution's
introduction of the prison's official logbooks for the purpose of
demonstrating that the defendant submitted false time records
was proper as a business record. 231 The court held that the
logbooks were trustworthy given that they are prepared by
Montana State Prison (MSP) employees as part of their routine
duties, and "[u]nlike the Incident Report used in Bean, the MSP
logbook records are prepared by MSP employees whose duties
are to report accurately the variety of people who enter and exit
the prison." 232 "[D]ocumentation of who was on shift (when an
employee arrived for and left from duty), and what occurred
during the shift was essential to the continued safety of the MSP
These safety concerns also
employees and inmates."23 3
234
prompted the logging in and logging out procedures.
3. Service Letters and After.Acquired Evidence
a. Service Letters
Montana statutory law provides that, upon request, a
discharged employee is entitled a "written statement of reasons
for the discharge. '235 The employer's response, containing the
discharge reasons, is referred to as a "service letter."236 In 1978,
the Montana Supreme Court held that, once an employer
provides an employee with a service letter, it cannot thereafter
rely on reasons other than those stated in the letter. 23 7 In 1995,
the Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding stating
that "in a wrongful discharge action the only reason for

incident report should not have been admitted because it 'lack[ed] sufficient guarantees
of trustworthiness" as it was based on the hearsay statement of the daughter. Id. 7 48.
The statement certainly was not trustworthy and consequently, was properly excluded.
231. 2004 MT 107, 1$ 18, 39, 321 Mont. 89, 7718, 39, 90 P.3d 971, 7 18, 39.
232. Id.
37-38 (citing Bean, 1998 MT 222, 290 Mont. 496, 965 P.2d 256.).
233. Id. $ 36.
234. Id.
235. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-801(1) (2003). The statute states "[i]t is the duty of
any person after having discharged any employee from service, upon demand by the
discharged employee, to furnish the discharged employee in writing a statement of
reasons for the discharge." Id.
236.
Swanson v. St. John's Luthernn Hnsp. 189. Mont 414, 49, 597 P.9d 709, 706
(1979) (stating that such letters are known as "service letters").
237. Id.
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discharge the district court could consider was the reason set for
'238
in the discharge letter.
The effect of these holdings was that plaintiffs counsel was
advised to always seek a service letter shortly after the
discharge to "lock-in" the employer's reasons for discharge. If
this was accomplished, the employer could not thereafter rely on
other reasons in defending the discharge.
However, in 1999, the Montana Legislature amended the
statute that served as the basis for the service letter rule in
three critical aspects: (1) to allow the former employer to, at any
time, modify the reasons stated in the service letter; (2) to allow
the employer to deviate from the reasons stated in the service
letter in presenting a defense in any legal action brought by the
discharged employee; 239 and (3) that the former employee's
"written demand" for a service letter must advise the former
employer of the "possibility that the employer's statements may
be used in litigation." 240 The affect of this amended language
permits the former employer to, at any time, modify the reasons
asserted in the service letter, and it provides that the former
employer is not bound in litigation only to the reasons asserted
in any service letters. 24 1 The statute continues to provide that
the former employer may not attempt to "blacklist" or prevent
238. Galbreath v. Golden Sunlight Mines, 270 Mont. 19, 23, 890 P.2d 382, 385
18
(1995) (citing Swanson, 182 Mont. at 417-18, 597 P.2d at 704). See also Bean,
(stating "in a wrongful discharge action, any reasons for discharge other than those set
forth in the discharge letter are irrelevant, and, thus, inadmissible") (citing Galbreath,
270 Mont. at 23, 890 P.2d at 385).
239. The amended language states:
A response to the demand may be modified at any time and may not limit a
person's ability to present a full defense in any action brought by the
discharged employee.
Failure to provide a response as required under
subsection (1) may not limit a person's ability to present a full defense in any
action brought by the discharged employee.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-801(3).

240. The amended language states: "A written demand under this part must advise
the person who discharged the employee of the possibility that the statements may be
used in litigation." Id. § 39-2-801(2).
The amended language requires that an employee's "written demand" for the
reasons for discharge must contain a statement that the reason(s) asserted may be used
in litigation. However, there is nothing in the statute that requires a former employee to
make the initial demand for the discharge reason(s) in "writing." The statute states "[i]t
is the duty of any person after having discharged any employee from service, upon
demand by the discharged employee, to furnish . . .in a writing a statement of the
reasons for the discharge." Id. § 39-2-801(1). Thus, while the employer's statement must
be in writing, there is no requirement that the former employee's initial request/demand
for the employer's written statement be in writing.

241.

Id. § 39-2-801(3).
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the former employee from obtaining employment elsewhere, but
242
the evidentiary effect of the service letter has been negated.
b. After-Acquired Evidence
The* "after-acquired evidence" rule may have a similar
consequence as the service letter rule.
In its narrowest
application, it states that an employer's defense in a
discharge/discipline case must rise or fall on the reasons the
employer proffered at the time of the decision. 243 The purpose of
the rule is to encourage employers not to discharge/discipline an
employee without first investigating to determine whether there
is "cause" for the adverse action and to discourage employers
from, after taking adverse action, scouring the earth to find
244
justifications for actions already taken.
The principal difference between the service letter rule and
the after-acquired evidence rule is that the service letter rule
had its basis in statutory law, whereas the after-acquired
evidence standards have been developed by the courts.
Courts have taken three approaches to after-acquired

evidence: (1) to completely exclude

it;245

(2) to allow it to

establish an employer defense, at least in some cases; 2 46 and (3)
to prohibit it from being used as a defense to liability, but
allowing it in determining the extent of a plaintiffs remedy.
The United States Supreme Court has adopted the latter
rational. In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., an
age discrimination case, the Court held that, if at the time of

242. Id. § 39-2-801(1). The statute continues to provide that if upon the former
employee's demand the employer refuses to issue a service letter within a reasonable
time, it may not hereafter do so or in any way 'blacklist or to prevent the discharged
person from procuring employment elsewhere, subject to the penalties and damages
prescribed... " Id. The penalty for violating the statute is a misdemeanor. Id. § 39-2804 (2003). An employer is also liable for punitive damages recovered via a civil action.
Id. § 39-2-802 (2003). The Act does not prohibit any person from truthfully advising of
the reason(s) for discharge to any entity to whom the discharged employee is seeking
employment. Id.
243. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995).
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Tricat Indus. v. Harper, 748 A.2d 48, 64 (Md. 2000) (stating that the
jury was to disregard employee's alleged wrongful conduct after termination because
conduct following discharge is not relevant to whether cause existed for termination).
246. See Gassmann v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, Inc., 933 P.2d
743, 744 (Kan. 1997) (holding that after-acquired evidence is admissible in a case not
"involving s vinltinn nf niihlir pnli

-; 1Mifnh_1_1 x" JToh-n W;e-er

T-

QOq Q.W.9.4 9r9

264 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to allow after-acquired evidence in a retaliatory
discharge action).
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discharge, the employer was motivated solely by illegal
considerations (e.g., age), it could not avoid a finding of liability,
but it could avoid a portion of the normal remedy-the employer
was liable for back pay and damages only from the date of the
adverse employee action up to the time it discovered the
legitimate grounds for such action. 247 Thus, in a discharge case,
if the employer is found to be liable on the basis of the originally
asserted reason(s) (e.g., unsustainable allegations of plaintiffs
poor work performance), but that the after-acquired evidence
(e.g., sustainable allegations of plaintiffs theft) justified the
adverse action, the employer is liable for monetary relief only up
248
to the time that it discovered the evidence of theft.
In the context of an age discrimination case or other
protected class discrimination (e.g., gender, race, disability,
religion, national origin, etc.), the United States Supreme
Court's treatment in McKennon of after-acquired evidence (i.e., a
finding of employer liability, but a limitation on monetary relief)
has an important positive affect for a plaintiff because if there is
a determination of employer liability, the successful plaintiff is
entitled to attorney fees regardless of how modest the amount of
damages (monetary relief) awarded. 249 In the context of a
MWDA case, the McKennon rationale would have little or no
positive affect for plaintiffs because successful plaintiffs are not
normally entitled to attorney fees. 250 Moreover, because the
MWDA entitles plaintiffs to such a narrow band of remedies,
primarily lost wages and benefits, 25 1 and the amount of such
relief (between the date of discharge and the employer's
discovery of the evidence that justifies the action) will be
meager, McKennon relief is of little value to plaintiffs.

247. 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995).
248. Id. See also Wallace v. Dunn Constr., 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995); Garrett v.
Langley Fed. Credit Union, 121 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. Va. 2000). The employer could
also avoid a "reinstatement" order requiring the employee to be reinstated to her former
position, a remedy provided for in an Age Act case, but not provided under the MWDA.
249. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act provide that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney's fee ..
" 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k) (2000).
250. The MWDA authorizes attorney fees in only two instances. See MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-2-914(4) ("A discharged employee who makes a valid offer to arbitrate that is
accepted by the employer and who prevails in such arbitration is entitled to have the
arbitrator's fee and all costs of arbitration paid by the employer."); Id. § 39-2-915 ("A
party who makes a valid offer to arbitrate that is not accepted by the other party and
who prevails in an action under this part is entitled as an element of costs to reasonable
attorney fees incurred subsequent to the date of the offer.").
251.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905..
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The Montana Supreme Court has consistently excluded
employer after-acquired evidence. This rationale has been based
on the Montana Blacklisting statute that required a service
letter. 252
With the 1999 amendments to that statute, a
defendant may argue that the service letter basis for excluding
after-acquired evidence (or any evidence not asserted in the
service letter) is gone. However, the amended language does not
require that all after-acquired evidence is admissible in a
wrongful discharge case.
The amended language only allows an employer to modify a
service letter response and to "present a full defense in any
action brought by the discharged employee." 253 Consistent with
that language, a Montana court may determine that afteracquired evidence is not relevant in cases where the plaintiff
alleges "unlawful retaliation."25 4 The fact that the employer
may have discovered after-the-fact evidence to support a "good
cause" for discharge is irrelevant where the plaintiffs claim is
based on the employer's prior violation of public policy arising
from the Montana or United States Constitution, a statute, or
255
an administrative rule.
252. Id. § 39-2-801. In Jarvenpaa,the court states the rule, but it determines that
the defendant "did not offer [objected to] evidence to present collateral reasons for [the]
discharge." Jarvenpaa, 41. The evidence was offered to "substantiate the reason it
had already given [in the discharge] letter." Id. See also Galbreath, 270 Mont. 19, 890
P.2d 382.
253. MONT. CODE ANN. 39-2-801(3).
254. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(6) (employer retaliation for the employees
refusal to violate public policy or for reporting violation of public policy).
255. See section "D. Proving & Defending: The Role of Motive & Causation" supra
pp. 382-86. A retaliatory discharge is unlawful if it was motivated by the employee's
refusal to violate public policy or for reporting such a violation. MONT. CODE ANN. § 392-904(1)(a). The fact that the employer may have after-the-fact discovered a "good
cause" for discharge is irrelevant. If the initial discharge was motivated by unlawful
retaliation, "after-acquired" evidence that there existed a "good cause" for discharge does
not lessen the employer's initial culpability, nor the damages that flow from the public
policy violation. See Gassmann v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, Inc., 933
P.2d 743, 744 (Kan. 1997) (holding that after-acquired evidence is admissible in a case
not involving a violation of public policy); Mitchell, 923 S.W. 2d 262, 264 (refusing to
allow after-acquired evidence in a retaliatory discharge action).
Alternatively, if the trier-of-fact determines that the discharge was caused
because of the employer's violation of its own written personnel policies (e.g., failure of
the employer to perform mandated evaluations and inform the employee of deficiencies),
but, based on after-acquired evidence, it is determined that the employee would have
otherwise been legitimately discharged (e.g., for employee theft), the McKennon rationale
appears applicable. A claim for relief based on an employer's violation if its own
puersonnel Policies is differsnt in tye and degree from a viol-atin of publi" P^lC".
Indeed, a violation of its own personnel policies is closely similar in degree to absence of
"good cause." In both cases, the employer's failure is based on misfeasance of a lesser
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Finally, a Montana court could adopt the most restrictive
256
approach to after-acquired evidence by excluding it entirely.
Such an approach is not inconsistent with the 1999 Legislature's
modification of the "Service Letter" statute.
The effect of the 1999 Legislative modification was to assure
that employers may modify the reasons stated in a service letter
in presenting a defense to any employee suit.257 Thus, an
employer is not solely bound by the reason(s) asserted for
discharge in a service letter, but that does not necessarily mean
that the employer may, based on after-acquired evidence, assert
For example, the
wholly unrelated reasons for discharge.
employer may have evidence of employee poor work
performance, rules violations, and economic necessity as
justifications for a discharge. However, in a service letter, the
employer cites only economic necessity as the reason for the
discharge. In such a case, the employer is not precluded from
thereafter relying on poor work performance and rule violations
in presenting a defense to a wrongful discharge suit. All of the
evidence existed at the time of the discharge and the employer
was aware of the evidence, but chose to cite and rely only on
economic necessity to justify the discharge. However, the Black
Listing statute, its requirements for a service letter, and the
1999 Legislature's amendments do not support the proposition
that the employer may, after the discharge, scour the earth to
find justifications for actions already taken.
Consistent with the 1999 amendments, an employer may
defend on reasons asserted in the service letter and with
justifications and evidence that exist at the time of discharge,
but, consistent with the "narrowest application" of the afteracquired evidence rule, not defend on justifications and evidence
unknown at the time of discharge.
F. Separationand Release Agreements
The federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
(ADEA) provides that a "separation and release"
agreement is invalid unless it meets certain conditions. 259 While
the conditions are codified in the ADEA, they are based on many
1967258

type than that of a public policy violation.
256. See, e.g., Tricat, 748 A.2d 48.
257. See also "Service Letter" discussion supra pp. 391-93.
258. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
259. Id. § 626(f).
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federal court decisions regarding employee "waiver of legal
rights" cases. Consequently, the ADEA standards have become
the criteria that employers' counsel consults in drafting
employee separation and release agreements, regardless of the
potential basis of the employee's subsequent suit. 2 60 Defense
counsel is advised to consult these standards in drafting any
employee release.
The ADEA states that, for an employee to waive any right
or claim under ADEA, the waiver must be knowing and
voluntary and will not be considered as such unless at a
minimum:
(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual
and the employer that is written in a manner calculated to be
understood by such individual, or by the average individual
eligible to participate;
(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising
under this chapter;
(C)
the individual waives rights or claims that may arise after
the date the waiver is executed;
(D) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for
consideration in addition to anything of value to which the
individual already is entitled:
(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an
attorney prior to executing the agreement:
(F)(i) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within
which to consider the agreement; or
(ii) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive
or other employment termination program offered to a group or
class of employees, the individual is given a period of at least 45
days within which to consider the agreement;
(G) the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days
following the execution of such agreement, the individual may
revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become
effective or enforceable until the revocation period has expired;
(H) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive
or other employment termination program offered to a group or
class of employees, the employer (at the 'commencement of the
period specified in subparagraph (F)) informs the individual in
writing in a manner calculated to be understood by the average
individual eligible to participate, as to(i) class, unit or group of individuals covered by such
program, any eligibility factors for such program, and any

260. See, e.g., Old Elk v. Healthy Mothers, Healthy Babies, Inc., 2003 MT 167,
316 Mont. 320, 6, 73 P.3d 795, 6.
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time limits applicable to such program; and

(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or
selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the
same job classification or organizational unit who are not
eligible or selected for the program.
In any dispute that may arise over . . . the validity of a
(3)
waiver ... [the employer has] the burden of proving [compliance
261
with this part].

G. Pre-dischargeHearing
With regard to Montana "public employees," it is critical
that an employee be provided with a "due process" hearing prior
The United States Supreme Court has
to the discharge.
determined that a non-probationary governmental employee has
a "property right" to her job, and that job cannot be "taken"
absent affording the employee a "due process" hearing prior to
the taking.262 The employer has to inform the employee of the
alleged wrongdoing or performance failure and offer an
opportunity to address the charges. This requirement may be
satisfied by giving the employee "oral or written notice of the
charges . . .and explanation of the employer's evidence and an
'2 63
opportunity to present his side of the story.
H. Employer Preventive Law Standards:Bases from Which
PlaintiffMay Argue Violation of the "Good Cause" Provision of
MWDA
1. Employer Preventive Law
A union-management contract typically includes a provision
that the employer may discharge and discipline employees only
upon a showing of "just cause." Union-management contracts
also typically provide that contract interpretation/application
Uniondisputes are to be resolved through arbitration.
management arbitrators have long developed criteria for
assessing whether a discharge or discipline was for just cause.
The Montana Legislature, in enacting the MWDA,
specifically chose the term "good cause," not the union261.
262.
263.

29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)-(3).
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
Id. at 546.
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management term "just cause," and it intended that the term
"good cause" was not to be construed in the same manner as
"just cause." 264
arbitrators construe
union-management
Accordingly, the following discussion is not intended as a legal
construction of the MWDA term "good cause." However, if an
employer complies with arbitrator-developed criteria used in
construing "just cause" in determining whether to discharge an
employee, it is suggested that any subsequent contest of that
discharge based on lack of "good cause" will be resolved in the
employer's favor. Accordingly, the discussion of "just cause"
standards is offered to provide employers with more definite
standards in making discharge decisions.
Union management arbitrators demand that for an
employer to demonstrate just cause, the employer needs to prove
based on a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the employee
committed the rule violation or performance failure; and (2) that
the employee was accorded appropriate process. 265 Certainly,
the first criteria--"did the employee do what the employer
charged"-is consistent with "good cause" under the MWDA. It
is only the second criteria involving "appropriate process" that is
potentially different.
The concept of "appropriate process" is not complicated and
involves familiar concepts. If a Montana employer uses these
elements as guidelines in assessing whether to discharge an
employee, the employer should be able to sustain the discharge
266
if it is contested. These guidelines are:
1. EMPLOYEES HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW WHAT IS
EXPECTED OF THEM AND WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF
NOT FULFILLING THOSE EXPECTATIONS WILL BE

264. The determination of legislative intent is based on the author's discussions
with those who participated in drafting the bill that ultimately became the MWDA.
265. In the union-management context, this concept is referred to as "industrial due
process." The industrial due process term has historical significance in the unionmanagement context because it arose at a time of industrial unionization. In the current
world, the use of the term "due process" is somewhat confusing if it equates the process
accorded employees with concepts of constitutional due process. However, as noted at
supra p. 398, in the context of discharging "public employees," the process that must be
accorded to meet constitutional requirements are very similar to the requirements
addressed here.
266. These guidelines represent the author's statement of universally accepted
standards used by labor-management arbitrators. See, e.g., DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE
BA Becks 1992 & Supp. 2001); James R. Redeker,
IN ARBITRATTON
n(Nrmnn
rn
rn
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE: POLICIES AND PRACTICES (BNA Books 1989); Adolph M. Koven &
Susan N. Smith, JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTS (BNA Books 1992).
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If an employer expects that employees will comply with
work rules and perform consistent with expectations, the
employer must inform employees of the work rules and the
performance expectations. The employer should also inform
employees that rule violations and non-performance may serve
as a basis for dismissal.
While the latter matter, consequences, may be implicit, it is
better for the employer to make what appears implicit, explicit.
Doing so is not time consuming and imposes little or no costs on
the employer. If done, it avoids the employee's argument that
he/she did not realize the importance of the matter.
As to the former matter, informing employees of the work
rules and performance expectations, again, the employer may
believe that rules and expectations are implicit. This is an issue
in which employees often take shelter in wrongful discharge
cases. Employees argue that the work rules and/or expectations
were not made explicit and they did not know the standards on
which their conduct would be judged. Again, employers are wise
to make sure that work rules and performance standards are
26 7
appropriately communicated.
2. THE EMPLOYEE HAS A RIGHT TO CONSISTENT AND
PREDICTABLE EMPLOYER RESPONSES TO VIOLATIONS OF
RULES
This element merely requires an employer react similarly to
similar violations of rules or performance standards. In doing
so, the employer demonstrates to its employees that it is
following its defined policy and that employees can expect to be
treated like their fellow workers.
This improves the
effectiveness of discipline as a deterrent to unacceptable
behavior because employees will see that discipline will be
consistently used when their conduct, or the conduct of fellow
workers, does not measure up to the employer's legitimate
expectations.

267. The communication should be a form that can be understood by reasonable
persons who work a particular position. This may necessitate that work rules and
performance standards be written or otherwise communicated in a manner which can be
understood by employees who have the least education and work experience in the
enterprise. An employer who fails to do so may encounter the argument that the
plaintiff did not know the standards because they were communicated in a manner that
the plaintiff could not understand.
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3. THE EMPLOYER HAS A RIGHT TO FAIR DISCIPLINE
BASED ON FACT

Supervisors must be trained to accurately gather facts
before discipline can follow. In this regard, record-keeping is
crucial. Prior to discharge or discipline, the employer should
make sure, through appropriate investigation, that discipline is
warranted. Failure to properly investigate often leads to the
plaintiffs argument that she was targeted for discharge for
reasons unrelated to those that the employer ultimately asserts.
4. THE EMPLOYEE HAS A RIGHT TO QUESTION THE
FACTS AND TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
This element suggests that employers should give an
employee accused of wrongdoing an opportunity to address those
accusations. The point of this exercise is to determine if the
accused employee has anything that will assist in evaluating the
merits of the accusation(s). This process may be very informal
and take very little time. The important thing is for the
employer not to make a conclusion on the merits of the alleged
wrongdoing before allowing the employee to address the
allegation(s).
5. THE EMPLOYEE HAS THE RIGHT TO APPEAL THE
DISCIPLINARY DECISION
A problem that often occurs when an employee is discharged
by his or her line supervisor is that the employee will claim that
the supervisor had a vendetta or unrelated illegitimate employer
issues. To avoid this situation, an employer should allow a
supervisor's initial decision to be reviewed by a more senior
management official, a person that is somewhat removed from
the focal point (e.g., passion/heat of the personalities and
moment) of the alleged employee misconduct, someone who may
be more capable of assessing the strength and weaknesses of the
case for discharge.
6. THE EMPLOYEE
DISCIPLINE

HAS A RIGHT TO

CORRECTIVE

The purpose of employment work rules and performance
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standards are to establish acceptable levels of employee conduct.
Employee conduct violations fall along a continuum from a
minor violation to very/extremely serious violations. Gross
misconduct involves matters that are essential to the survival of
the organization, such as rules against theft, destruction of the
employer's property, assaulting a supervisor, failing to follow
safety procedures, or continued performance failures. Other
violations involve matters that are important to the smooth
operation of the organization, and generally only after a number
of violations will they affect the stability or profitability of the
organization.
These include reporting to work on time,
maintaining the work schedule, conducting personal business
during work hours, failure to call in when absent, and minor
performance failures.
Discipline has a rehabilitative as well as deterrent effect.
When disciplinary action is required for minor offenses, it is
initially usually for the purpose of correction and an employer
uses a lesser form of discipline (e.g., counseling, warnings, or
even a suspension). Corrective discipline suggests that, unless
an employee has committed a major offense, he/she should not
be discharged until he/she has been given the opportunity to
modify his/her behavior through the imposition of lesser
penalties. By first imposing lesser (through increasingly severe)
penalties, the employer places the employee on notice that
his/her behavior is not acceptable, and he/she is given an
opportunity to change it before discharge action is taken.
Corrective discipline is, therefore, a problem-solving, training
approach up to the point where an employee demonstrates by
his/her continued infractions that they will not correct their
unacceptable conduct.
7. THE EMPLOYEE HAS A RIGHT TO BE CONSIDERED AS
AN INDIVIDUAL
Under this topic, there are two subtopics: (1) whether the
discipline was appropriate in relation to the offense and the
individual; and (2) whether the alleged wrongdoing (e.g., rule
violation/performance failure) was the result of a "disability" for
which the employer had an obligation to make "reasonable
accommodation."
(i)

Discipline in Relation to the Offense and the Individual
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In the above discussion of corrective discipline, it is
suggested that, because the employer has hierarchy of
disciplinary measures to choose from, such as counseling,
warning, and suspension, the employer should deal with minor
employee conduct problems initially with a corrective approach.
Additionally, the employer should consider the employee's work
record in choosing the appropriate form of discipline. Long-time
employees with good work records will normally receive lesser
forms of discipline than relatively new workers-particularly
Thus, appropriate
new workers with poor work records.
discipline requires not only a consideration of the offense, but
also the status of the offender.
(ii) Employee Misconduct
Disability Act

and

the

Americans

with

While the focus of this article is wrongful discharge, any
employer analysis regarding whether the employer should
discharge an employee must consider the Americans with
Disability Act (ADA) protections. 268 The ADA requires an
employer to accommodate "qualified employees" with a
"disability."269 Thus, if an employee's unacceptable conduct is
the consequence of a disability, the correct employer response is
to attempt to accommodate the employee's disability, not to
discipline or discharge him or her. While it is not the intent of
this article to analyze the ADA, employers must be aware that
employee rule violations or performance problems may be the
consequence of a disability, which require accommodations, not
punishment.
2. Bases from Which PlaintiffMay Argue Violation of the "Good
Cause"Provisionof MWDA
The above standards for assessing "just cause" for discharge
may be used for attacking a discharge under the MWDA "good
cause" standard.
The MWDA defines "good cause" as "reasonable job-related
grounds for dismissal." Thus, the employer is subjected to a
reasonableness standard and the jury will be so instructed. The
above standards, if complied with, suggest an employer who has

268.
269.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000).
Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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"reasonably" responded to employee misconduct. As stated in
the discussion of "good cause,"270 the fact that the employer is
able to demonstrate employee wrongdoing may not be sufficient
to demonstrate "good cause." Where the employee's failures
were in part the fault of the employer, wrongdoing does not
equate to "good cause." Secondly, it is difficult to imagine a jury
finding for an employer who: (1) discharges a long-time
employee based on a rule violation or performance deficiency
that itself is a minor violation; (2) has not established and
communicated rules or performances standards; (3) has not
discharged other similarly situated employees; (4) has not
carefully investigated the alleged wrongdoing; and (5) has not
given the discharged employee an opportunity to address the
allegations prior to discharge. The employer satisfaction of the
above standards are not a required matter of law, but, if
complied with, the defendant will have a stronger factual case;
alternatively, the plaintiff will have a much more difficult
factual case.
V. CONCLUSION

The basis for Montana wrongful discharge lawsuits is the
MWDA. Since its inception in 1987, it has been sparingly
The significant developments in the law have
amended.
occurred as the Montana courts have interpreted the Act's
language and applied it to fact. While this development will
continue, many, if not most of the Act's provisions have been
construed and applied, and consequently the law has become
fairly settled.
Also settled is the fact that plaintiffs have a claim based on
Where
wrongful employer conduct apart from discharge.
available, plaintiffs prefer these suits because the limitations
found in the MWDA are not present. Because of the advantage
that these suits provide plaintiffs, it is anticipated that this will
be a growth area of the law.
Finally, it is anticipated that the practice in this area of law
will become more sophisticated as counsel become better versed
on how this subject of state practice is entwined with the
broader practice of employment law.

270.

See supra pp. 336-39.
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